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The supersession of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union                         
(AU) in 2002 marked a paradigm shift in African international relations. While the OAU                           
had become known as a talking shop that failed to foster integration, the AU was                             
established with a revived commitment to African unity. This thesis examines what                       
lessons the European Union has to offer for African integration and the achievements and                           
shortcomings of the AU. I find that its legal and institutional framework displays an                           





























































































Africa can and will only advance through African integration, which can be                       
realized through the Federal United States of Africa. 
­ Cheikh Anta Diop 
I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in                             
their efforts to solve the problems of this continent. I dream of our vast deserts, of                               
our forests, of all our great wildernesses. 
­ Nelson Mandela  
One of the achievements of our blood­stained century if it may be called an                           




The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2001 and its subsequent                       
inauguration in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 marked a paradigm shift in African                           
international relations. The AU’s predecessor organization, the Organization for African                   
Unity (OAU) had been established in 1963 with the promotion of unity and solidarity                           
among African states, the improvement of the lives of African peoples, the defense of the                             
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, the eradication of all forms of                         
colonialism in Africa, as well as the intensification of international cooperation as its                         
objectives. Of these, it succeeded in achieving the liberation of the continent from                         1
1 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, Art. 2.1.  
1 
colonialism and apartheid, as well as the protection of national sovereignty of member                         
states, but has come under criticism for its dismal performance with regards to its other                             
objectives. It came to be known as an organization that accommodated the interests of                           
national governments but failed to address the challenges which its member states and                         
their peoples faced during the years of its existence. The end of the Cold War, the                               
successive victory against apartheid, and the beginning of the dismantling of authoritarian                       
regimes across Africa during the 1990s fostered hope for political and economic                       
transformation on the continent. Thus, at the turn of the twenty­first century, a group of                             
African leaders sought to revive the ideology of Pan­Africanism and give new                       
momentum to Kwame Nkrumah's vision for a united African continent. Lead by Thabo                         
Mbeki of South Africa, these leaders, among whom were Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria,                         
Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Abdul­Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Joachim Chissano of                     
Mozambique, and Alpha Oumar of Mali, envisioned a future in which African states                         
would reduce their dependence on external aid and intervention and collectively establish                       
the continent as a major player in global governance. These leaders saw integration as                           2
the core prerequisite for developing African solutions to African problems and for                       
gaining influence internationally. Through the pooling of sovereignty and harmonization                   
of policies, they argued, African countries would increase their bargaining power                     
vis­​à​­vis the rest of the world, and accelerated economic integration would moreover                       





first, OAU members committed to a review of the OAU Charter to assess whether                           
changes should be made to the organization in order to foster closer integration under the                             
OAU framework and what the nature of such changes would be, the slow pace of said                               
review propelled member states to create a new organization altogether. At the Fourth                         3
Extraordinary Session of the OAU in 1999, they adopted the Sirte Declaration, which                         
announced, inter alia, the establishment of the African Union, accelerated economic                     
integration, and the planned drafting and adoption of a constitutive legal text for the new                             
union. The entry into force of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the Constitutive                             4
Act) in May 2001 following the establishment of the AU in March of the same year made                                 
manifest the desire to deepen continental integration in Africa. The Constitutive Act                       
provides for new institutions that the OAU had lacked, namely the African Court of                           
Justice, the Pan­African Parliament (PAP), and the Economic and Social Council                     
(ECOSOCC), which have been designed to allow for a more democratic union through                         
the engagement of civil society. It additionally reflects a paradigm shift with regards to                           
the norms of state sovereignty and non­interference that were enshrined in the OAU                         
Charter. By endowing the AU with the power to intervene in member states in grave                             
circumstances as well as in the event of an unconstitutional change of government, the                           
Constitutive Act counters the reluctance to get involved in the domestic affairs of                         







African international relations since independence. African leaders created a continental                   
organization that raised hopes domestically, continentally, and globally. 
The revived vision for an African transformation through Pan­African unity that                     
had lead to the establishment of the AU arose in response to two fundamental challenges                             
affecting African states, one old and one new. The old challenge is that of                           
underdevelopment and undevelopment, while the new challenge is that of globalization.  
Underdevelopment and undevelopment in many ways, albeit not entirely, relate to                     
the legacy of colonialism on the continent. With few notable exceptions, such as                         
Botswana, the hopes for development that had characterized the independence era had                       
not materialized throughout much of Africa by the end of the Cold War. Although the                             
OAU Charter listed among its objectives the improvement of the lives of African people,                           
development remained a predominantly domestic policy area that was carried out through                       
state­led approaches and paired in many places with destructive nationalist projects.                     
Together with the OAU’s doctrine of strict non­interference in the domestic affairs of                         
member states, these policies frequently resulted in economic stagnation at best and                       
decline at worst.  
Exemplary of these trends were the disastrous attempts at villagization through                     
resettlement in Ethiopia in the 1980s, as well as the economic decline in Zaire, today the                               
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), under Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule between 1965                       
and 1997. The DRC in many ways represents the most acute example of the particular                             
developmental challenges affecting many African countries after independence. The                 
4 
legacy of brutal colonization by Belgium, paired with low levels of precolonial                       
production during the Kingdom of Kongo in which the economy was based on slave trade                             
and resource extraction, produced extractive political and economic institutions that                   
continued to exist after independence. Corruption, capital flight and conflict became                     5
widespread, preventing productive accumulation and investment in the provision of                   
public goods. Despite being one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural                               
resource abundance, between 1965 and 1997 real GDP per capita in the DRC as                           
measured in constant 2005 US Dollars fell from $742.3 to $254.1, and further to $206.6                             
by 2000. Moreover, much of the country is affected by undevelopment, as vast areas are                             6
out of the reach of existing infrastructure and state power. At the same time, much of the                                 
known resource wealth of the DRC has been and continues to be exploited to the benefit                               
of foreign firms and small local elites, leading to the generalized high vulnerability                         
reflected in the decline of the material standard of living as shown by the falling GDP per                                 
capita.   7
The DRC may constitute an extreme case of failed development on the African                         
continent, but its fate is instructive to the understanding of the challenges of                         
undevelopment and underdevelopment in Africa. In addition to underdevelopment, that                   
is, the exploitation of local resources for the benefit of foreign powers and                         







colonialism meant that African states were integrated into the global economy on the                         
terms of the colonizers. This frequently resulted in the economies of African states being                           
based on the export of a handful or less primary commodities for consumption and                           
value­added manufacturing in the West. As a result, many African economies became                       
vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices and lack the kind of diversification                         
of production that reduces such vulnerabilities. Colonialism, moreover, had as a                     
consequence that, with only few exceptions, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan,                       
African countries did not take part in the processes that created global cooperation and                           
integration regimes at the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN), and under the                           
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because these regimes were                     
negotiated before the majority of African states had gained sovereignty, they                     
disproportionately institutionalized Western interests. At independence, African states,               
like other formerly colonized countries, thus started out from a disadvantaged position on                         
the global political and economic playing field.  
At the time of the transformation of the OAU into the AU, the failure of African                               
states to single handedly deal with the challenges of undevelopment and                     
underdevelopment had become apparent. Member states had sought to collectively                   
address the problems relating to development in Africa at least since the 1980                         
OAU­backed Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (The Lagos                         
Plan of Action). The Lagos Plan of Action aimed to increase the self­sufficiency of                           
African economies and to better the terms of international trade, specifically with the                         
West, for African countries. This ultimately failed to be implemented, as the World Bank                           
6 
published the Berg Report in response taking a radically different approach to African                         
development than the Lagos Plan. Instead of increased self­sufficiency, it advocated for                       
further trade liberalization and unlike the OAU document, it blamed African leaders, not                         
the international community, for Africa’s dismal economic situation. These developments                   
intensified the negotiations for deepening continental integration which ultimately                 
resulted in the creation of the AU. 
The second, and more recent, challenge confronting African states is that of                       
globalization. Traces of globalization are ubiquitous in today’s world. Multinationals                   
like the Coca Cola Company have devised clever mechanisms to market their products to                           
even the most remote corners of the globe, and the falling costs and increasing                           
availability of communications and information technology continue to decrease the                   
barriers to the creation and maintenance of social relationships that are both local and                           
distant. Simultaneously, four decades of neoliberal economic policy have brought about                     
the continuous integration of national markets into the global capitalist economy through                       
increased international flows of goods, services, capital and labor. In an increasingly                       
interconnected world with said globalizing processes at play, states are often caught                       
between domestic and international demands. On the one hand, the twentieth century and                         
the first two decades of the twenty­first century have tended toward international                       
integration. On the other hand, protectionism among nations states has risen, especially in                         
the aftermath of the Great Recession, and popular support for integration efforts has                         8
begun to decline in many places. The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed                             
8 ​Andrew Jones, ​Globalization: Key Thinkers ​(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 11. 
7 
the emergence of a multiplicity of regional economic and political integration agreements                       
in addition to the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 and the World                             
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. While the European Union (EU) is certainly the                         
most prominent example among these as the most integrated regional organization to                       
date, regional political and economic integration is a priority on the foreign relations                         
agenda of many states worldwide. Examples include the North American Free Trade                       
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in Latin                   
America, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Across the diverse and rapidly decolonizing African continent, the desire for                     
continental unity manifested itself first in the creation of the OAU in 1963 and later in its                                 
transformation into the AU in 2002. Because of the aforementioned failure of the OAU to                             
achieve the kind of integration that would allow its member states to collectively confront                           
the challenges that globalization and development posed, and to increase their influence                       
in global affairs, member states began to seek new ways to foster integration. The 1990                             
Declaration on the Political and Socio­Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental                       
Changes Taking Place in the World announced that OAU member states believed that the                           
forces of globalization were affecting Africa and that the precarious political and                       
socio­economic situation on the continent should be addressed through integration that                     
would foster peace and enhance development. Ultimately, the AU was established to give                         
new momentum to the aspirations to find solutions to the challenges of development and                           
globalization that had not been found at the OAU. 
8 
While in the light of continuing globalization, this kind of regionalism is often                         
viewed as a mechanism to advance the interests of countries within a given geographic                           
region in global governance, the AU so far appears to have displayed a limited impact on                               9
global international relations in the fourteen years of its existence despite the ambitious                         
agenda that had lead to its inception. In addition, the African continent continues to face                             
challenges that affect the performance of the AU and its constituent regional economic                         
communities (RECs), raising the question whether there can be meaningful advances in                       
economic and political integration in Africa as long as peace, stability, democratization,                       
and development do not advance. 
Against this broad backdrop, this thesis examines the state of the African Union in                           
the context of globalization and analyzes the reasoning for, and challenges to, African                         








In order to answer these questions, I first review the pivotal concepts related to this study                               





in Africa in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses the question whether European integration                         
can or should serve as a model for integration in Africa. It considers the similarities and                               
differences between the EU and AU, assesses the achievements and shortcomings of                       
European integration, and, finally, outlines the lessons that the European experience has                       
to offer for the AU. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the achievements and                           
shortcomings of the AU. Based on these four chapters, I assess the prospects for future                             
integration on the African continent under the AU framework in the concluding chapter. 
This work is based in part on interviews with experts on African integration                         
conducted in Brussels and elsewhere during 2014. I conducted this while working on an                           
independent research project on comparative regionalization in Africa and Europe during                     
a semester of study abroad in The Hague, the Netherlands.. I approached potential                         
informants, who included diplomats, academics and consultants, via email. I obtained                     
interviews with an expert scholar researching the AU, as well as an African diplomat who                             
formerly worked for the OAU, and at the time of interviewing held a diplomatic post in                               
Brussels. The bulk of the other interviews used in this study were conducted in Addis                             
Ababa in the summer of 2015. During this time, I was granted access to the AU                               
headquarters, where I had opportunities to talk with permanent AU staff in various                         
divisions. I moreover had the chance to interview diplomatic staff working in Addis                         
Ababa. While I sought to obtain interviews with staff from the United Nations Economic                           
Commission for Africa (UNECA), as well as the Pan­African Chamber of Commerce                       











Any comprehensive study of international integration in Africa ought to consider                     
the theoretical frameworks and historical context that inform the present of the AU.                         
Otherwise, one risks mistaking the present condition of African integration as ahistorical                       
and therefore overlooking the processes that have shaped its present state, as well as the                             
underlying causes of some of the challenges it faces. Before turning to the specific                           
history of international integration in Africa, this chapter discusses the five main concepts                         
that inform this study of international integration in Africa. These are: globalization,                       
integration, the state, power, and, finally, development. Below I review these concepts in                         
relation to integration in Africa, and relate them to the African continent in general where                             
appropriate.  
1.2. Globalization 
The concept of globalization provides the overarching conceptual framework on                   
which this study is based. Globalization has been on everyone’s lips since at least since                             
the 1990s, yet it represents one of the "most used but also one of the most misused ... and                                     
11 
confused words around today." The globalization debate began to blossom in the late                         10
1980s, when it was identified as a driver of social change worldwide by scholars such as                               
Anthony Giddens and David Harvey. Globalization scholarship has since evolved in                     11
different directions and within various scholarly disciplines, but with a general trend                       
toward the defense of globalization arising during the 2000s, simultaneous with the                       
emergence of anti­globalization movements in global civil society. Although the debate                     12
about globalization remains relevant and heated, and a multitude of work has been                         
published about it, there remains a lack of agreement among scholars and policymakers                         
alike on what constitutes it. This disagreement about how globalization can be defined is                           
rooted in part in disciplinary contexts and in part in the epistemological frameworks                         
employed by scholars of globalization. Still, and most broadly, globalization can be                       13
conceptualized as "the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of                     
society," but scholars in different disciplines provide distinct theories on the causes of                         14
globalization and the processes by which it occurs. 
Roland Robertson, Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells provide sociological                 
perspectives on globalization. According to Robertson, globalization refers to “both the                     
compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a                           









diminishes the importance of territorial boundaries in human relations. He identifies                     16
four elements that together compose what he terms the global field: nation states,                         
individuals, international relations, and a consciousness of the common humanity of                     
people. The processes of globalization alter these distinct fields: nation­states become                     17
more internally diverse than they had been at their inception, individuals claim more                         
complex identities, international relations expand across the entirety of the globe, and the                         
consciousness of common humanity gives rise to debates on issues such as gender and                           
sexuality. Robertson rejects the idea that globalization has as a consequence the                       18
universalization of world culture. He writes,  
the concept of globalization has involved the simultaneity and the interpenetration                     
of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or ­ in more abstract                             
vein ­ the universal and the particular.   19
 
He thereby captures an important aspect of globalization that is often overlooked, namely                         
that globalization not only homogenizes the economic, political and social spheres of                       
societies worldwide, but that it also creates the heterogenization of the latter. In short,                           









Giddens has defined globalization as “​the intensification of worldwide social                   
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by                             
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” To him, globalization represents not                         20
so much a historical rupture that initiated a new epoch, but rather an accelerated                           
continuation of modernity. Modernity, according to Giddens, has produced three                   21
important processes which have radicalized to form globalization. Firstly, it has brought                       
about the separation of space and time through the introduction of time measurement.                         
Secondly, social relations have been lifted out of local contexts of time and space. Lastly,                             
social practices are reconfigured in a reflexive relationship with novel information.                     22
Giddens, too, identifies four elements of globalization, namely the nation­state system,                     
world capitalist economy, world military order, and the international division of labor.                       23
Unlike Robertson’s socio­cultural approach, Giddens focuses on institutional effects of                   
globalization, whereby his four key features of modernity ­ surveillance, military power,                       












globalization is the process by which human activity in its dif​ferent dimensions                       
becomes selectively and asymmetrically organized in interactive networks of                 
performance that function on a planetary scale in real time.   24
 
Like that of Robertson and Giddens, Castells’ understanding of globalization thus                     
involves a change in the relationship between space and time but Castells specifically                         
identifies the emergence of modern information and communications technology as                   
globalization’s ultimate cause. He firstly argues that information and communications                   
technology has shifted the predominant mode of economic production from industrial                     
capitalism to informational capitalism beginning in the 1970s. Although industrial                   25
production continues to exist alongside that of informational capitalism, the latter has                       
increased the interpenetration of different locales of production. Moreover, industrial                   26
capitalism implies an increasing importance of human capital intensive goods in                     
international trade, which has produced a new global North­South division of labor                       
between the “knowledge­rich” North and the “knowledge­poor” South. Castells further                   27
ascribes a pivotal importance to the growing integration of global capital markets, and                         28
argues that in the context of informational capitalism, “states shift their attention away                         










information and communications technology has created what Castells terms a network                     
society, whereby horizontal networks of people have gained importance over vertical                     
organizations and can flexibly operate on a global scale in real time, leading to the                             
changing of social structures and the reshaping of culture.  30
Moving from sociology to the field of economics, Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik                         
provide alternative frameworks of globalization that also address its implications for                     
global political economy. Stiglitz defines globalization as  
the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been                           
brought about by the enormous reduction of the cost of transportation and                       
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods,                         
services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.   31
 
In his view, globalization is not an inherently good or bad process. Rather, it has been                               
dominated by powerful developed states that have continued to shape its processes in                         
ways that are advantageous to them and their corporations, thereby preventing                     
globalization’s “potential to do enormous good” from materializing itself and                   32
alleviating poverty in less developed countries. He further argues that as a result of the                             
political power of developed states, the global governance institutions regulating the                     
global economy, primarily the IMF and the World Bank, have become preoccupied with                         
neoliberal market fundamentalism, alternatively known as the Washington Consensus.                 33






policies towards struggling developing countries that either advocated for, or, in the case                         
of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), imposed, fiscal austerity, privatization, and                   
liberalization. Stiglitz argues that fiscal austerity was socially disruptive to the point of                         
prompting conflict, privatization was carried out too speedily to produce positive effects,                       
and liberalization was taken too far, so that the development of weak economies was                           
compromised because a lack of capital and entrepreneurial capacity prevented them from                       
reaping the potential gains from trade. To make globalization work for the world’s poor,                           34
Stiglitz argues, institutions of global economic governance must undergo comprehensive                   
reform in favor of less developed economies.  35
A political economist, Rodrik bridges the disciplinary gap between politics and                     
economics in the globalization debate. Although Rodrik’s concept of globalization is                     
based primarily on economic considerations, and he considers capitalism to be                     
inseparable from globalization, his work resonates with Castells’ view that globalization                     36
shifts states’ policy focus outward to competitiveness in the world economy. Rodrik                       
emphasizes the relationships between states, globalization, and governance. He defines                   
two types of globalization ­ “hyperglobalization” and “moderate” globalization ­ which                     
can be distinguished by the degree of agency that international trade agreements leave                         
states with to pursue domestic policies. Hyperglobalization is becoming increasingly                   37






include domestic policy areas. Lastly, Rodrik introduces the model of the political                       38
trilemma of the world economy, according to which of deep international integration, the                         
state as an independent territorial jurisdiction entity, and democratic mass politics merely                       
two out of three can be realized at the same time.  39
For the purpose of this study, and leaning on the works discussed in this section, I                               
propose globalization to be the set of continuous economic, political and social processes                         
that are caused by innovation in communications and information technology and that                       
have as a consequence the simultaneous homogenization and heterogenization of all                     
aspects of society.  
1.3. Integration 
Integration, also referred to as international integration, most broadly refers to the                       
process by which states enter into agreements with each other to create policy                         
cooperation by adopting shared institutions and rules. Although integration can address                     
any policy area, economic integration has historically been both most common and a                         
frequent stepping stone towards political and social forms of integration. It can be defined                           
as “a​n economic arrangement between different regions marked by the reduction or                       
elimination of trade barriers and the coordination of monetary and ​fiscal policies​.”                       40







cooperation, or both. It must, however, occur between often adjoining states located                       
within a supranational geographical region, as opposed to across great geographical                     
distance. 
The main theories of international relations, namely neo­liberalism, neo­realism,                 
constructivism and neo­idealism, do not, or at least not fully, address the concept of                           
integration, as a result of which particular theories of international integration have                       
developed. The bulk of international integration theory originated in the context of                       
European integration after the Second World War and has subsequently been applied to                         
other regional contexts. This creates a fundamental theoretical problem for the study of                         
non­European regional integration, since even where scholars acknowledge the                 41
particularities of the region studied, non­European regional integration tends to be                     
analyzed against the backdrop of the European experience. ​In the African context, the                          42
characterization of the continent’s integration regimes in comparison to the European                     
model have frequently lead to the conclusion that they are weak. Particularly in the                           43
African context, however, it can be argued that it remains instructive to consult theories                           











The most prominent among the specifically European theories, in a chronological                     
order, have been federalism, functionalism, neo­functionalism, multi­level governance,               
and consociationalism. While federalists like Spinelli in the aftermath of World War II                         
emphasized the need to avoid future war by integrating the governance of otherwise                         
competing nation states, functionalists such as Mitrany believed that a shared need for                         
technocratic governance of certain economic and social sectors would create institutions                     
that in the long run gain legitimacy and promote international governance.                     45
Neo­functionalist theories of integration, too, emphasize the integration of economic                   
sectors; however, they add the idea that integrating strategic economic sectors that have a                           
low political priority will create spillover effects to additional sectors and promote further                         
institutionalization of integration. More recently, theories of multi­level governance have                   
introduced the idea that states are not the only actors that link domestic politics and                             
international governance. Instead, they advance the idea of multi­level policy­networks                   
that involve states and non­state actors alike. Lastly, advocates of consociationalism                     46
like Lijphart argue that entities with sharp internal divisions can successfully be governed                         
through power­sharing between the elites of contesting groups. While Lijphart’s                   47







interpretations of the European Union that can be extended to regional integration                       48
regimes in Africa. 
In addition to these Eurocentric theories, three groups of scholars working on                       
integration globally have emerged more recently. On the one hand, the neoliberal and                         49
institutionalist groups continue to employ the state and formal institutional actors as the                         
primary unit of analysis in the study of integration. Neoliberal theorists, such as Friedrich                           
von Hayek of the Austrian School and Milton Friedman of the Chicago School, advocate                           
for the complete liberalization of trade, which they argue would increase overall welfare                         
by harvesting the gains from trade. To neoliberalists, the creation of regional trade blocs                           
hence represents the second best scenario to the complete liberalization of world trade,                         
since barriers to trade continue to exist between them. The institutional approaches can                         50
be divided into three broad categories: historical institutionalism, rational choice                   
institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. First, in historical institutionalism,               
development is characterized by path dependency and unintended outcomes, and                   
historical change is created at critical junctures, such as economic crises. Second,                       51
rational choice institutionalism of integration places institutional actors at the center of                       










attainment of the closest approximation of the latter. Third, sociological institutionalism                     52
focuses on culture, values, identities, and ideas. On the other hand, new regionalism                         53
theory has shifted analysis away from formal actors and toward ‘informal sectors,                       
parallel economies, and non­state coalitions.”  54
It is important here to make a conceptual distinction between international                     
integration that occurs at the global level under the WTO framework, and regional                         
integration regimes. Regionalism, as it occurs in Africa under the AU framework, ​can be                           
defined as the tendency toward integration of the societies within a given supranational                         
region. In essence, it can be seen as globalization on a smaller scale and according to                               55
the economic, political and social particularities of the region in question. Regions, in this                           
sense, can be considered intermediate communities between nation states and the global                       
community. And while within regions, globalization­like processes of homogenization                 
are at play, regionalism may simultaneously create heterogenization at the world scale by                         
providing regional groupings of states with the opportunity to create communities                     
vis­​à​­vis the globalizing capitalist economy. Regions thereby exemplify               56
heterogenization within a  homogenizing global context.  
More technically, the degree of economic integration between two or more states                       
is commonly classified in six categories. First, preferential trade agreements constitute                     







barriers between member states. Second, free trade areas are distinct from preferential                       57
trade agreements in that they entail the removal of all barriers to trade between member                             
states, but members maintain individual trade policies towards non­members. Third,                   58
customs unions are free trade agreements with the addition of a common external tariff                           
towards non­members, as well as harmonized external trade policies. Fourth, common                     59
markets are customs unions in which the free movement of the factors of production, in                             
particular capital and labor, is guaranteed. Fifth, economic unions display a substantial                       60
coordination of economic policies and some unification of economic institutions in                     
addition a common market. Lastly, the most complete form of economic integration is                         61
the monetary union, in which members adopt a common currency and create a                         
supranational central bank.  62
In terms of institutional design, then, political integration is related to economic                       
integration not only in that the two usually accompany each other, but also since a                             
complete political union consists of a monetary union whose members centralize political                       
institutions and begin to act if not as a quasi­state, then at least as a regional bloc.                                 63
Looser forms of political integration exist in the form of international policy cooperation                         

















To understand the dynamics of regional and continental integration in Africa it is                         
necessary to devote some attention to the concept of the state, as well as the history and                                 
properties of the state in Africa in particular. Much of the literature concerning                         
post­colonial African politics is centered around an analysis of the state, and given the                           64
predominantly interstate/intergovernmental nature of the AU and its constituent RECs,                   
states continue to play a dominant role in the evolution and implementation of                         
international integration agreements on the continent. Despite widespread consensus                 
about the significance of the state for the study of contemporary African politics and                           
international relations; however, “there is precious little agreement on its conceptual                     
meaning or the interpretive implications of its analysis.” Much like the concept of                         65
globalization, the concept of the state has become so ubiquitous that its meaning is                           
frequently assumed to be tacitly understood. 
The origins of political philosophy concerning institutions of political rule in                     





development of the modern state as a particular form of political organization. While                         
some would advance examples such as the Greek polis or the Asante Empire as evidence                             
for the worldwide existence of the state before the advent of modernity, Max Weber has                             
argued that “the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full                             
development.” This suggests that such pre­modern forms of political organization, even                     66
if they were state­like, lacked certain features that the modern state possesses. It is hence                             
important to delineate these features and to arrive at a definition that places the concept                             
of the state in the context of modernity. 
Max Weber and Karl Marx provide two prominent theories of the modern state.                         
Weber famously defined the state as “the form of human community that (successfully)                         
lays claim to the ​monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.”                         67
He later added “an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation” as a                             68
defining feature of the state. Weber’s work emphasizes the territoriality and legitimacy of                         
rule, as well as the bureaucratic depersonalization of political power that an institution of                           
political rule must possess in order to be considered a state. Unlike Weber’s, Karl Marx’s                             
theory of the state focuses less on the elements that compose a state than on its activities                                 
and purpose. According to Marx, the state is the instrument of political control by the                             








determined by class struggle, which in turn is characterized by the development of the                           
dominant mode of production of a society.   70
Leaning on Weber and Marx, I define the modern state as the legitimate                         
aggregation of collective power which translates itself into systems of governance over a                         
particular territory and group of people. This definition includes Weber’s notions of                       
political legitimacy in the creation of state institutions, and that of the depersonalization                         
of political power inherent in enduring systems of governance, as well as a Marxian                           
understanding that the exercise of state power through its systems of governance is                         
necessarily carried out by a group of people over the rest of society.  
The state can then be understood to consist of four distinct but interrelated                         
elements: a leader, a regime, an administration, and a commonwealth. The element of                         71
the leader refers to the individual who is the head of state or government at any given                                 
point in time, a regime consists of the high­ranking executive officials surrounding the                         
leader, the administration is composed of positions within a perpetual infrastructure, and                       
finally, the commonwealth refers to a sense of common belonging, a solidarity between                         
strangers that transcends networks of kinship. The first three elements perform the                       72
functions that the state today is commonly assigned, namely the responsibility to protect,                         






provision of public goods, and the maintenance of general security, while the fourth                         73
element serves as a source of legitimacy of the state. Lastly, its performance and                           
legitimacy constitute the two determinants of the relative strength or weakness of the                         
state.   74
In historical perspective, the modern state has evolved as a form of political                         
organization in Europe. Although a variety of forms of political organization existed in                         
pre­colonial Africa, modern state organization was largely, though not exclusively,                   
imported to the continent during the era of colonization. Thus, conceptions of                       75
Westphalian sovereignty, too, were not widespread in African political systems before                     
colonization, during which they were central to justifying land grabbing. The signing of                         76
the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 ended a number of major wars in Europe and                             
established the sovereign state as the basic unit of the modern international political                         
system. The Westphalian understanding of sovereignty had at its core the principles of                         77
territorial integrity and strict non­interference in the internal affairs of a state, as well as                             
the state’s right to exercise external sovereignty, i.e. to enter international agreements                       












reflected the colonial partition of the continent more so than “the realities of community                           
and accountability” within the territories of the newly independent states. Combined                     79
with the establishment of Westphalian sovereignty as a cornerstone of African                     
international relations by the OAU Charter in 1963, this lead to a series of                           80
nation­building attempts featuring opportunistic authoritarian leadership and a substantial                 
amount of intra­state conflict over access to the state in the period from the 1960s to the                                 
1990s. As Basil Davidson has written, “the nation­statist project – the attempt to turn                           81
colonially formed territories into nation­statist territories – looks increasingly like a                     
mistake [...].” The African state since independence has appeared, at least on the                         82
surface, like the European state which it was modelled on, but functioned quite                         
differently.  83
Norms concerning state sovereignty have not been static, and are more complex                       
today than the mere principle of non­interference in domestic affairs. Although state                       
sovereignty continues to play a crucial role in international relations, and the state                         
remains the primary, albeit not sole, actor in the international domain, there is a gradual                             
breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. As globalization                     84











irrelevant for postmodern states,” and global and regional integration regimes have                     85
created highly elaborate and legally binding systems of mutual interference in the internal                         
matters of states. There has consequently been a breakdown of the strict protection of                           
Westphalian sovereignty on the African continent as well. This paradigm shift was                       
further accompanied by the emergence of responsibility to protect as a guiding principle                         
in international relations, and the diminishing of international acceptance of the violent                       
byproducts of nation­statist projects. The African state today is increasingly accountable                     
to its partners in policy cooperation and integration, both regionally and internationally. 
1.5. Power  
That some people have more power than others is one of the most palpable facts                             





The concept of power is instructive for the study of African regionalism, since                         
international integration necessarily involves a reconfiguration of the relations of power                     
between local, national, and regional actors. Power has been considered extensively in                       
social and political theory. Existing definitions of power are more operational than                       
formal, that is, they define power in terms of how it is derived and exercised rather than                                 86
in terms of what it is. It is possible to identify a formal core within existing operational                                 




make someone else do something, even if this is against their will. Max Weber has thus                               
defined power as ​“the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in                                       
a social action even against the resistance of others,” while Karl Deutsch has defined                           87
the concept as “the ability to prevail in conflict and overcome obstacles” in reference to                             88
Lenin’s famous “Who? Whom?”. Lenin’s question alludes to a Marxist understanding of                       
power, according to which a limited amount of power in society is necessarily distributed                           
in such a way that one group dominates over another 
What the provided definitions have in common is a recognition that power                       
necessarily involves a relation between people. Wherever there are human communities,                     
power exists and is exercised, regardless of their level of development or whether the                           
social and political organization of these communities appears rather hierarchical or                     
egalitarian at first glance. Thus, “to understand politics is (...) to understand relations of                           
power in their historical settings.” To understand relations of power, however, it is                         89
necessary to first understand the different kinds of power, as well as how those in power                               
derive it, and what the different ways in which it is exercised are. 
Five different kinds of power can be identified: physical, economic, political,                     
cultural or “soft”, and sticky power. Physical power refers to physical force, such as that                             
exercised by the military and police. Economic power refers to the ability to achieve                           







power is predominantly positive, that is, it involves economic incentives as a reward for                           
complying with the demands of those exercising economic power, such as in the                         
relationship between wage­paying firms and their laborers. Economic power can                   
additionally be exercised negatively through the denial of the means of subsistence.                       
Political power, on the other hand, is exercised mainly by way of negative incentives in                             
the form of the threat or use of punishment when those actors over whom political power                               
is exercised do not comply with the demands of those who possess it. Examples of                             
political power include criminal procedures against those who break the law and                       
sanctions against states who fail to implement binding international agreements. Cultural                     
power is more abstract than the previously discussed forms of power in that it pertains to                               
the ability to direct the dominant way of thinking in the arts and intellectual life of                               
society. Sticky power, lastly, is a set of qualities that an actor possesses that motivates                             
others to follow their lead voluntarily, such as states seeking accession to the European                           
Union and consequently implementing domestic legal reforms to meet EU regulations                     
even before accession is approved. 
Max Weber has further distinguished between two broad categories of power on                       
the basis of their legitimacy, namely coercive power and authoritative power. While                       90
coercive power involves obtaining an end through mere force, authoritative power                     
implies consent by those over whom power is exercised. Patrick Chabal, in a similar vein,                             





“the voluntary or habitual compliance of the mass of the population is the invisible but                             
very real basis of power for every government.” Chabal further argues that although                         92
purely coercive power may occur in human societies, it cannot last as it is inherently                             
self­destructive.   93
This distinction in the literature between coercive power and legitimized power,                     
which in its exercise may also involve some degree of coercion, is reflected in Gramsci’s                             
notion of hegemony. Hegemony may thus be defined as the domination by one group of                             
people over another that is not purely based on coercion but simultaneously involves                         
consent. The origin and nature of such consent is what Chabal terms political                         94
accountability, referring not to the perceived legitimacy of government but the processes                       
by which power has historically been reproduced within any given political community.                       
“Political accountability,” Chabal writes, “defines the framework within which the                   
political legitimacy of rulers is assessed, the criteria by which they are judged.” Rulers,                           95
and political elites more broadly, emerge from society and exercise power over the latter.                           
Chabal has called this the hegemonic drive. Because hegemony implies a certain amount                         
of coercion, and because dissent is natural in any political community,                     
counter­hegemonic projects by actors not in control of the state and its institutions prevail                           








coercion, however, such counter­hegemony does not lead to major reconfigurations of                     
political systems. 
Weber distinguishes between three sources of political accountability, which he                   
alternately terms authoritative power: charisma, tradition, and rational legality. Charisma                   
refers to personal qualities of leaders which compel others to follow them. Traditional                         
authority is derived from custom, whereby power is reproduced in hereditary manner,                       
such as in a monarchy. Rational­ legal authority, lastly, is based in a universal rule of law                                 
that governs how power is reproduced and how it can be exercised. Talcott Parsons                           
criticizes the dichotomy in the literature between coercive and consensual power,                     
suggesting that instead of being discrete forms of power or related to each other in                             
subordination, both coercive and consensual power are imperative but related to each                       
other in more complex ways.   96
In the African context, there have been two revolutions in political accountability,                       
or, in other words, reconfigurations of power, namely the imposition of the colonial                         
system and its abolition at independence. While it is difficult to generalize across a                           97
continent as vast and diverse as the African one, precolonial forms of political                         
organization in Africa can be said to have been characterized less by Weberian                         
legal­rational and depersonalized conceptions of power, and more by a system of                       
tribalism, that is, the politicization of kinship relations, whereby kinship was a decisive                         




become a controversial one on account of misconceptions that originated from colonial                       
perceptions of Africa, yet it deserves rehabilitation as a valuable category of political                         
analysis in its own right, so long as one succeeds in avoiding treating it with a normative                                 
eurocentric lens. Tribalism, like most of political systems, has its own assets as well as                             
liabilities that are worthy of consideration. Among its liabilities are the aforementioned                       
distribution of positions of power by kinship relations rather than merit, the social                         
expectation of unconditional mutual economic support among group members that G​öran                     
Hydén has famously termed the “economy of affection” and constrictive loyalty of                       
individuals to their respective groups that can sabotage unity over larger territories. Its                         
assets, on the other hand, include a strong sense of social solidarity and belonging, group                             
consciousness, and mutual support between members of a group.  
Basil Davidson has characterized precolonial relations of power on the African                     
continent as contextually legitimate but profoundly misunderstood by colonial masters:  
[...] most of these precolonial political formations were communities with a                     
venerable past rooted in popular acceptance. In the public mind they were living                         
realities; they were identities to which people strongly held. Dismissing them as                       
the regrettable phenomenon of “tribalism” might comfort those, British or                   
otherwise, who preferred to think of precolonial Africa as a kind of savage                         
backwoods [...].   98
 
Based on this categorization of African power relations as backwards and illegitimate, the                         
colonial state established itself with either disregard for existing relations of power, or, as                           
in the case of Belgian divisive ethnic policy toward Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, coopted                             
them for its own purposes. Furthermore, “the power of the colonial state was not only                             
98 ​Davidson, ​The Black Man’s Burden​, 100. 
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absolute but arbitrary,” and derived to a large extent from coercion. With the advent of                             99
independence, African leaders “would then embrace nation­statism as the only available                     
escape from colonial domination” and dismiss the prevailing ethnic diversity in their                       100
national polities as “just another hangover from an unregenerate past.” This resulted in                         101
the reconfiguration of power relations in Africa into neo­patrimonial networks                   
characterized by often violent inter­group struggle for access to the state as a source of                             
wealth. Widespread corruption, as in many other locales globally, created the paradoxical                       
situation that the political elites of some of Africa’s poorest countries boast some of the                             
world’s superrich. Rather than escaping the grip of colonial power through nationalism,                       102
many African states, under frequently poor leadership, have responded to the                     
vulnerabilities created by colonialism through power­structures that benefit few at the                     
expense of the citizenry. Since the institutions in African states are disproportionately                       
weak and checks and balances relatively few or unenforced, leaders in Africa in fact have                             
more, not less, power than their counterparts elsewhere.  103
Because struggle over control of the state became a defining feature of power                         
relations in Africa after independence, Jeffrey Herbst has argued that the implications of                         










The nation­state rose to dominance in Europe largely because its unique ability to                         
unite market and population under sovereign rule provided leaders in successive                     
centuries with ‘economies of scale’ in military, economic, and political affairs                     
that could not be achieved any other way.  104
 
According to Herbst, African conditions privileged smaller rather than larger states                     105
inasmuch as a smaller territory had as a consequence fewer challenges for the                         
consolidation of power after independence. Relating to Davidson’s argument on                   
nationalism, tribalism and neo­patrimonialism, a smaller territory implies less diversity                   
that needs to be accommodated as a part of any hegemonic project for the national                             
consolidation of a state’s territory. The way that power in African states, specifically in                           
the territorially large ones, is exercised today resembles precolonial patterns: It is strong                         
at the political core of a state but radiates out with decreased authority. The most                             106
prominent difference between the exercise of power within African states today and                       
during precolonial times is that unlike before the fixing of borders, the territorial                         
boundaries of political formations in Africa was determined by the reach of their power,                           
not vice versa.  107
The question arises here whether closer integration in Africa along the vision of                         
the early Pan­Africanists, such as Nkrumah, and the New Pan­Africanists, such as Mbeki,                         
could constitute a third major reconfiguration of power on the continent. In Chabal’s                         







to a reconfiguration of power relations in favor of the citizenry and the accommodation of                             
diversity?  
1.6. Development  
The concept of development has proven to be a contentious one in both theory                           
and practice. While the conventional definition of development, namely sustained                   
economic growth that is accompanied by institutional transformation, would cause little                     
disagreement among scholars and policymakers alike, the nature of these institutional                     
transformations has been contested. Moreover, ideological disagreements as to how                   
development can be achieved have historically characterized the development discourse,                   
and international development policy has been criticized for promoting one­size­fits­all                   
Western­style modernization without taking into account the particular contexts of                   
developing countries.  
Expanding on the broad definition provided above, development involves not                   
only an increase in incomes, or economic growth, but also institutional transformation in                         
the social, economic and cultural spheres. Amartya Sen sees these institutional                     
transformations as the removal of unfreedoms that leave people without opportunities to                       
exercise their agency, while according to David Apter, development is the expansion of                         
alternatives available to individuals and collectives. Development, then, concerns four                   
areas of society: the environment, the economy, political life, and cultural life. The                         
environment provides the resources that economic growth is based in; however, it should                         
only be exploited insofar as future potential for growth is not diminished significantly. In                           
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the economic sphere, development aims at the creation of favorable material living                       
standards. Development of the political life involves the creation of inclusive and strong                         
institutions, the promotion of civic life, and participatory politics. Lastly, transformations                     
in the previous three areas are accompanied by changes in the cultural life of a society.                               
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization                   
(UNESCO), development, far from merely involving improvements in material living                   
standards, “​is a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and                         
spiritual existence.”  108
Historically, ​development in a sense did away with the idea of the inherent                         
superiority of Europe, or, more broadly, developed countries, and instead advanced the                       
idea that improvement in the human condition would not simply come about by organic                           
social forces and economic processes but required the intervention by both the                       
governments in developed and less developed countries in cooperation. Based on this                       109
idea, global development policy and practice underwent a series of distinct phases.                       
During the later part of the era of colonization, development was predominantly                       
characterized by investment into the infrastructure of the periphery by the colonizing                       










states to be able to maintain their colonies, but on the contrary eventually proved pivotal                             
to their conviction that they could give up colonies. The 1950s, the years of the coming                               111
of independence on the African continent, were characterized by a development discourse                       
that emphasized modernization and an increase in national incomes, but when results                       
failed to materialize, the dependency school emerged in 1960s, arguing that                     
Western­style development policy produced and reproduced economic dependence.               112
The response in the 1970s to these tendencies was a shift away from an emphasis on                               
industrialization and national incomes, and toward an approach that focused on basic                       
needs, prioritizing the work of non­governmental organizations over large­scale                 
modernization projects. Because developing countries worldwide, but especially on the                   113
African continent, continued to experience economic downturn into the 1980s, two                     
opposing camps of development critics emerged: Ultra­modernists, on the one hand,                     
believed that ​the rules and processes of economics have proven valid and that the                           
invisible hand of the market allocates resources efficiently. Postmodernists, on the other                       
hand, saw development discourse as an apparatus of surveillance and control. The                       114
1980s further witnessed the proliferation of SAPs as a neoliberal policy measure aimed at                           
relieving the economic problems of developing countries that ran significant budget                     









development was needed in response to the overall disappointing record of international                       
development since its inception. While no one coherent global paradigm has emerged,                       
focus has shifted toward initiatives such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, as                         
well as toward international economic integration as a means to create sustainable                       
economic growth.  115
Development is a continuous process of transformation that occurs in all societies                       
regardless of their relative level of economic development as economic, political, social                       
and cultural relations continue to evolve. The concept of development has, however, been                         
especially important in Africa since independence as both underdevelopment and                   
undevelopment continue to be a challenge to Africa’s transformation. Underdevelopment                   
refers to the process by which resources in a country are exploited for the benefit not of                                 
its own people but for that of more economically powerful countries. Historically,                       
underdevelopment has occurred as the process of exploitation by developed countries of                       
the resources of developing countries, both during and after colonization.                   
Undevelopment, on the other hand, refers to the lack of exploitation of natural resource                           
potential, be it known or yet undiscovered. The particular experience of colonization in                         
Africa has, as scholars of the dependency school have argued, resulted in the integration                           
of African countries into the global economy on unfair terms. The economies of African                           
countries have under colonialism frequently been transformed from predominantly                 
self­sufficient systems into economic systems that primarily rely on the production and                       
export of few or even a single primary commodities. In some instances, such as for the                               
115  ​Dixon, Nel and Binns, ​Africa​, 332. 
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production of cocoa in Ghana, colonial powers even introduced a commodity that had                         
previously not been produced in the territory in question. What these transformations                       116
had as their effect were the dependence of many African economies on the export of                             
primary commodities and lack of economic diversification. This often resulted in                     
long­term economic difficulties, such as currencies and national incomes being                   
vulnerable to fluctuations in the global commodity prices, Dutch disease, and the kinds of                           
extractive economic and political institutions that resource wealth incentivizes. Paul                   
Collier has labelled a generous natural resource endowment a development trap for the                         
poorest countries globally, together with conflict, being landlocked without reliable                   
neighbouring states, and bad governance in small states. Collier interestingly sees a                       117
small territory as a liability to economic development, even though a small state size                           118
can bring about other advantages, such as the comparatively easier consolidation of                       
political power as I have elaborated in the review of the concept of power in Chapter 1.5. 
Collier’s emphasis on conflict and leadership highlights the importance of                   
political determinants of the relative success or failure of development in addition to                         
economic and geographic factors. Claude Ake has gone so far as to contend that in                             
Africa, “the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never                               







the greatest impediment to development.” Development, together with nationalism,                 120
replaced decolonization in its centrality on the political agenda of African leaders once                         
the struggle for independence had been won. With their state­led approach to                       
development, however, the first generation of postcolonial leaders in Africa actually                     
reinforced the dependency of African countries, and centralized development                 
programmes constituted an opportune way to exert control over distrusted civil society                       
groups. Development frequently became an ideology coopted for the production and                     121
reproduction of political domination, a means for leaders to stay in power. Robert                         122
Rotberg emphasizes the importance of the quality of leadership for achieving desired                       
development outcomes in Africa, “where institutions are unusually weak and democratic                     
political cultures are as yet largely unformed.” He makes the argument that imaginative                         123
political leadership with a long­term vision, as opposed to transactional leadership                     
concerned merely with daily business, or worse, their own benefit, can successfully                       
counteract impediments to development, such as resource dependence, unfavorable                 
geography, and corruption. The quality of leadership consequently constitutes an                   124
important piece in the puzzle of explaining why some African countries, such as                         









With regards to international integration, the concept of development has been                     
especially important in Africa, but has continued to play a role in other regional                           
integration organizations worldwide. In the context of contemporary globalization,                 
neo­liberalism has been one of the primary ideologies with regards to economic                       
development since the 1980s, and especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The                               
neo­liberal tendencies of economic globalization, however, have meant that                 
"globalization today is not working for many of the world's poor,” and "ideological                         125
market fundamentalism […] produced a set of policies that were more hindrance than                         
help in producing economic growth and development.” To neoliberals, the creation of                       126
regional trade blocs constitutes the second best blueprint for international development                     
after a fully liberalized world economy in which, according to them, resources would be                           
allocated in the most efficient manner, and overall welfare would be maximized. This                         127
of course does not address concerns about equity, and the neoclassical development                       
paradigm often ignores history and the structures it creates. The central question                       128
regarding development and globalization, then, is whether international economic                 
integration promotes economic development, or whether its competitive pressures cause                   
developing countries to fall behind and place limits on the ability of states to provide                             
public goods and act as welfare states. Stiglitz has argued in this regard that in order to                                 129








they should receive special and differential treatment in terms of tariffs and that the                           
developed world should open its markets but without conditionality or expectation of                       
political or economic reciprocity. Through its various integration efforts, the African                     130
international community has tried to reap such benefits of integration by increasing its                         
domestic markets through integrating among each other, and thereby increase its                     












The history of African integration in many ways can be traced back to the struggle                             
against slavery in the United States and the Caribbean and the ideology of                         
Pan­Africanism that it gave rise to. ​Early international integration in Africa was                       
consequently deeply intertwined with the Pan­Africanist movement that first emerged                   
from the African diaspora in the late nineteenth century. The very idea of a unity of                               
Africa can be traced back to the emergence of Pan­Africanism and the work of W.E.B.                             
DuBois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and the like. For while, in                         
Europe, five hundred years ago the rulers of two kingdoms geographically remote from                         
each other might have easily seen themselves as a part of the same geographical space                             
they called Christendom, this would not have been true anywhere on the vast and diverse                             
African continent until the late nineteenth, or even early twentieth century. Where, then,                         
did the idea of this vast place as a unified entity begin, and how did it lead to the creation                                       
of formal integration regimes that, albeit in evolving nature, persist in Africa to this day?                             
This chapter seeks to provide a history of African integration that encompasses its major                           
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On the African continent, the impetus for the formal international integration that                       
manifested itself in the creation of the OAU in 1963 grew primarily out of the                             
independence movement and Pan­Africanism as a political ideology, where early                   
integration efforts after independence were largely political, although some regional                   
economic groupings had been established on the continent under colonial rule already.                       131
The idea of global unity among African peoples and peoples of African origin, albeit less                             
formalized, had existed at least half a century before the advent of the institutionalization                           
of continental unity in Africa. The origins of the Pan­Africanist movement can be traced                           
back to the 1900 conference called by the Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams                         
that was held in London to “protest stealing of lands in the colonies, racial discrimination                             
and deal with other issues of interest to Blacks,” and which later became known as the                               132
First Pan­African Conference. A number of influential figures, all members of the black                         





stages. Most notably, Edward Wilmot Blyden is widely considered to be the father of the                             
philosophy of Negritude, while W.E.B. DuBois was the first theorist of Pan­Africanism,                       
and Marcus Garvey had an influence on many of the early Pan­Africanists from the                           
African continent, such as Kwame Nkrumah.  133
This early Pan­Africanist movement was “an effort to unite the black race in the                           
struggle for emancipation from racial discrimination, as well as from colonialism,” and                       134
as such less concerned with political or economic integration of the kind that the AU                             
practices today. Nevertheless, imprints of these notions of liberation from discrimination                     
and foreign domination on integration in Africa are apparent even at present and after the                             
official abolition of slavery, as well as the global end of colonialism, apartheid and racial                             
segregation laws. For although in seeking complete integration of the continent, the AU                         
has a mandate that transcends the fight against colonialism, the ultimate rationale for                         
continental unity lies precisely in the fight against foreign domination in the forms of                           
neo­colonialism and dependence. During the years of the First Pan­African Conference                     
and the subsequent five Pan­African Congresses held outside of the African continent                       
between 1919 and 1945, the Pan­African movement underwent a change from being                       
driven predominantly by intellectuals from the diaspora toward inclusion of and                     







continent. Although the Pan­African Congresses were aimed at achieving equality for                     135
black people worldwide, and W.E.B. DuBois famously claimed the right for black people                         
to self­determination at the first Pan­African Congress, the first four Pan­African                     
Congresses, held in Paris in 1919, London in 1921 and 1923, and New York in 1927                               
were still dominated by intellectuals from outside of Africa. The fifth Pan­African                       136
Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, in contrast was called for by Africans from Africa,                             
and included among its participants Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast (now Ghana),                         
Wallace Johnson from Sierra Leone, Sourou­Migan Apithy from Dahomey (now Benin),                     
and Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya. Arguably, the coming together of leaders of the                         137
independence struggle on the African continent laid the foundation for the transformation                       
of early Pan­Africanism into the africanized concept of Pan­Africanism that called for                       
unity and integration of the continent in addition to the liberation from colonialism. 
As decolonization gained momentum across Africa, the continent was left even                     
more territorially fragmented than it had been under colonial rule, so that “the sheer                           
viability of many of the constituent states was open to question.” Following Ghana’s                         138
independence in 1957, the first generation of post­independence leaders in Africa saw                       
regional integration as a way to overcome the challenges faced by the newly independent                           
states on a balkanized continent. In 1958, the first Conference of Independent African                         






and colonies, eight of them independent, to discuss the future of the continent. However,                           
this early unity was complicated when a group of former French colonies joined the club                             
of newly independent countries in 1960, and disagreement emerged over two key issues,                         
namely the possibility of territorial reorganization on the continent, and the total                       
liberation from European powers. The second Conference of Independent African                   139
States, which was held in Addis Ababa in 1960, became known for dissent on the                             
continent. The conservative leaders of Cameroon, Congo­Brazzaville, Ivory Coast,                 140
Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger,                   
the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Chad formed the Brazzaville bloc in 1960.                         141
While they were not opposed to regional integration in itself, they rejected the immediate                           
establishment of a United States of Africa and sought to maintain a close relationship                           
with France. In response to the Brazzaville bloc, the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Ghana,                           142
Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco formed the radical Casablanca Group in 1961 which                         143
was deeply committed to the struggle against imperialism and supported the formation of                         
a United States of Africa. Later in 1961, the Brazzaville Bloc merged with the moderate                             
leaders of Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Somalia, and Tunisia to form the                         










By 1962, it seemed unlikely that an agreement between the two camps regarding                         
African integration would be reached, especially because there were significant divisions                     
over the Congo Crisis and Patrice Lumumba. When, however, the UN rejected Tshombe                         
as potential leader in August 1962, the main source of disagreement between radicals                         145
and conservatives disappeared and integration negotiations gained impetus. Finally, Haile                   
Selassie brought African leaders from the Casablanca and Monrovia groups together in                       
Addis Ababa in 1963, where the OAU was founded on May 25th by the thirty three                               
founding states, namely Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo                   
Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Congo Leopoldville (now Democratic Republic of                   
Congo), Dahomey (now Benin), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast,                     
Liberia, libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,                 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Tunisia, Uganda,                   
Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Zanzibar (now Tanzania). In 1964, African                       146
leaders fixed the map of Africa by accepting colonial borders. The remaining states on                           147
the continent joined the OAU as they became independent: Kenya in December 1963,                         
Malawi and Zambia in 1964, the Gambia in 1965, Botswana and Lesotho in 1966,                           
Mauritius, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea in 1968, Guinea­Bissau in 1973, Angola,                     
Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, as well as Sao Tome and Principe in 1975, the                           






1993, and South Africa after the victory against apartheid in 1994. Western Sahara,                         148
albeit not independent, joined the OAU in 1982 as a result of which Morocco, which                             
occupies its territory to date, left the union in 1984 and has not been readmitted since. 
The trajectory of African integration has been since 1963 characterized by                     
compromise between the two former camps in that although regional integration                     
initiatives in Africa are plentiful, there has been continuous opposition to the                       
relinquishing of state sovereignty to supranational institutions. Article 3 of the OAU                       
Charter enshrined the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of member                       
states, as well as the strict adherence to the principle of non­interference in the internal                             
affairs of member states. It thereby halted the radical camp’s ambitions for establishing                         149
a United States of Africa and obstructed the accomplishment of the objectives to promote                           
unity and solidarity among African states and to improve the lives of African peoples                           
listed in Article 2 of the same charter. The OAU became known at worst as an                               
intergovernmental club of dictators, and at best as a continental organization that failed to                           
address its continent’s most pressing issues, such as the 1981 civil war in Chad. The                             150
OAU remained intergovernmental with its main institutions being the Assembly of Heads                       
of State and Government, The Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat. While                         
the OAU accomplished its objective of fighting colonialism and apartheid with the                       






the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, it failed to foster meaningful                         
economic or political integration on the continent. Considering that the focus of                       
post­independence leaders throughout most of the OAU era lay primarily on                     
nation­statism, the consolidation of political power, and state­led development within                   
their territories, however, the OAU has arguably never set out create or implement any                           
integration policies that would have involved a relinquishing of national power in favor                         
of continental frameworks in the first place. 
The failure of African leadership at the continental, or even regional, level to                         
foster integration, collectively strive for solutions to the widespread problems on the                       
continent, and to create systems of mutual accountability was mirrored in                     
overwhelmingly poor leadership and policy domestically. By the 1980s at the latest, the                         
hopes for development that had emerged after independence had chiefly disappeared with                       
numerous African states running immense budget deficits and increasingly failing to                     
provide essential public goods. The 1980s thus became known as “the lost decade” in                           
Africa due to the severe economic problems, increased debt, falling tax revenues and                         
reduced public spending. The involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions via SAPs                       151
with hindsight proved to be a one size­fits all approach to recovery from economic crisis                             






The austerity measures thus imposed on African governments in the 1980s                     
notably challenged the legitimacy of authoritarian leaders in many African countries,                     153
since their mismanagement of the state was the ultimate cause of the crisis before and                             
after the SAPs. Popular demand for more participatory governance rose, and paradigms                       
concerning governance gradually began to shift on the continent. When what Samuel                       
Huntington termed the third wave of democracy brought about the collapse of the                         154
Soviet Union in 1991, there was a spillover effect and “over a period of five years, most                                 
of the one­party systems that had prevailed in Africa for a generation were                         
dismantled.” With Soviet support for African socialism elapsed, states across Africa                     155
transitioned away from authoritarian rule, but it was less clear what they were                         
transitioning toward, as many of them remained caught in the grey zone between                         
dictatorial rule and democracy. While many observers began to speak of an “African                         156
renaissance” and authoritarian rule became less acceptable on the continent toward the                       
new millennium, the achievements of the third wave of democracy in Africa remained                         
limited and uneven. Nonetheless, during the last decade of the twentieth century, voices                         










An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and                       
representing a dynamic force in  global arena. 
­ African Union Vision  











The history of the OAU brings out the fundamental challenge of Pan­Africanism,                       
namely whether it can be translated into effective continental institutions, or whether                       157
ideas of solidarity and unity crumble when faced with the political and economic realities                           
of Africa since independence. If Pan­Africanism is not only the ideology of liberation of                           
blacks from slavery and racial discrimination that it initially emerged as from the African                           
diaspora in the Americas and Caribbean, but represents also a “strategy for social                         
solidarity, as well as cultural, political and economic emancipation” among Africans in                       158
Africa, then a continental African organization ought at a minimum to strive to combat                           






OAU and the national leaders that had dominated it for most of its lifespan in fact                               
perpetuated such threats to Pan­African objectives that a new generation of Pan­African                       
leaders, lead by Thabo Mbeki, called for an African renaissance. This initiative was “born                           
out of a deep desire to revive a marginalized and exploited continent ravaged by centuries                             
of slavery, colonialism, neo­colonialism, exploitation, oppression, conflict and hunger,”               
through the kind of integration the OAU had hitherto not attempted, or initiated yet not                               159
implemented: integration that generates African solutions to African problems and                   
ensures their execution. With its emphasis on the concepts of unity and solidarity, the call                             
for an African renaissance returned the question of what has the capacity to unite a billion                               
people across a vast and vastly diverse continent. After all, if there is nothing that can                               
unite Africans other than geography, the idea that integration can bring about African                         
solutions to African problems is at best idealistic. The African renaissance                     160
presupposes, just as Pan­Africanism had presupposed throughout its history, that Africa                     
is united and capable of speaking with one voice despite its diversity, and that the                             161
failure of the OAU to institutionalize African emancipation through African integration                     
was caused primarily by a lack of commitment of African political leadership to good                           
governance rather than an inherent implausibility of continental unity. The fundamental                     









African renaissance advocated for by the new generation of Pan­Africanists in the 1990s                         
and 2000s lies in the assertion that with regard to emancipation from colonialism and its                             
effects,  
African political and economic thought has been trapped in its own myths [...], it                           
has been misused by dictators in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Guinea,                       
Togo and Cameroon, who claim that the rest of the world has no business                           
criticizing their human rights violations, stolen elections, and culture of                   
corruption.  162
 
The leaders that eventually brought the AU into being thus positioned themselves outside                         
the previously prevailing paradigm of bad governance and created the new                     
Pan­Africanism as a truly Janus­faced philosophy: continuously outward looking in its                     
aspiration to fight the effects of colonialism and imperialism, yet looking inward with                         
self­reflection at the factors beyond colonialism which have contributed to the dire                       
political and economic condition of the continent after independence. These new leaders                       
in a sense positioned themselves in opposition to the remainder of authoritarian                       
leadership and dreamt up a reconfiguration of African integration that would target the                         
perpetuation of human rights violations, stolen elections and the culture of corruption. 
To understand why the OAU was transformed into the AU with the adoption of                           
the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lomé, Togo, in 2000, the following question                             
must first be answered: What characterized the historical context that this new                       
Pan­Africanism and the idea of African solutions for African problems emerged from?                       
On the one hand, the transitions away from authoritarianisms that proliferated following                       
162 Ibid. 
56 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fostered a culture of hope for participatory                             
politics and improved domestic governance across Africa. On the other hand, these                       
transitions coincided with the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1980s.                         
This period was characterized by increased foreign involvement on the continent beyond                       
the infamous SAPs. Often, foreign actors would become involved in the domestic affairs                         
of economically viable countries, but beyond the SAPs, involvement in poor countries                       
was perceived to be lacking by African leaders, as was exemplified by retreat of the                             
international community form the international intervention in the Rwandan genocide in                     
1994. External agendas, driven by global demand for African commodities such as oil                         163
and coltan, moreover continued to influence African international relations. This                   164
challenged the credibility of the international development discourse of the time. And                       
despite political transitions occurring domestically, the economic situation across the                   
continent remained precarious in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2002, Africa’s share in                         
world trade fell from 2.7 per cent to 2 per cent. These events raised to question African                                 165
domestic and regional policy at once. In the crisis years between the 1970s and 1990s, in                               












The historical context of this period therefore generated the desire to reinvigorate                       
integration in two ways. Firstly, foreign involvement in African affairs continued to be                         
perceived negatively on the continent, and African influence in global economic and                       
political affairs remained negligible. Moreover, the modern world system that African                     
countries had been incorporated into at independence persisted as one that perpetuates                       
economic dependency and political conditionality, hampering the potential for African                   
development. Pooling of influence presented itself as a mechanism to improve Africa’s                       
position in global relations. Secondly, as authoritarian rule became less acceptable, the                       
leadership of many OAU member states changed, and critiquing domestic governance                     
became somewhat more commonplace. Recognition followed that if the continent was to                       
become more prosperous and powerful, domestic economic, political, and social                   
problems had to be addressed first. A revised continental integration regime would                       
accordingly allow the formulating of shared goals and developing of new mechanisms for                         
mutual accountability.  
The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1981 World Bank report “Accelerated                         
Development in Sub­Saharan Africa: A Plan for Action”, known better as the Berg                         
Report, were among the first attempts to stimulate a transformation of the continent.                         
They underscore the tension between the domestic and international causes of Africa’s                       
economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s. While the OAU­backed Lagos Plan of Action                           






remnants of colonialism and imperialism, the Berg Report identified domestic budgetary                     
mismanagement and poor governance as the root causes of the crisis. By implication, the                           
UNECA and World Bank proposed different remedies for the problem. The former                       
advocated for increased economic self­sufficiency of the continent and improved terms of                       
trade. The latter instead saw increased trade liberalization and integration into the global                         
economy as the solution. The Lagos Plan of Action failed to be implemented in light of                               
the economic situation on the ground and its criticism by the World Bank, and the tension                               
between the two explanations of the crisis informed the transformation of the OAU into                           
the AU. OAU member states had set up a committee for the review of the OAU Charter                                 
in 1979 already, yet by the 1996 it was obvious that it possessed “an apparent lack of a                                   167
sense of urgency.” In the 1999 Sirte Declaration, member states thus proclaimed the                         168
coming establishment of an African Union, without, however, specifying whether it                     
should exist alongside or instead of the OAU and the AEC. Plans to reconfigure the OAU                               
were abandoned altogether with the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in Lomé in                           
2000. With its entry into force in May 2001, following ratification by two­thirds of the                             
member states, the AU was officially created to supersede the OAU. 
The limited achievements of the OAU with regards to its objectives of deepening                         
integration in Africa and improving the lives of African people, combined with the                         







abandon the OAU altogether. In 2001, the AU superseded the OAU and the optimism of                             
African leaders was evident at the AU inaugural summit in Durban in 2002. The AU                             169
not only revised the OAU’s insistence on sovereign self­determination and the principle                       
of non­interference, it was also established to have more powers and institutions than the                           
OAU. Most notably, the Constitutive Act of the African Union established a                       
Commission, a Court of Justice, and the Pan­African Parliament in addition to some                         
specialized committees and initiatives. The AU furthermore consolidated the many                   170
regional integration initiatives that had developed on the continent by recognizing eight                       
RECs in its Constitutive Act as the building blocks of the AEC, which had been                             
established by the Abuja Treaty in 1991 and is meant to achieve complete economic                           
integration by 2027. I address the history of the AEC more fully in the following                             171
section.  
With the transition from OAU to AU, the African political community underwent                       
a paradigm shift in its norms surrounding state sovereignty and the principle of                         
non­interference in the domestic affairs of states. The AU Constitutive Act diverges to a                           
great extent from the OAU Charter in this regard. While the OAU was built around the                               
strict principle of non­ínterference as outlined in the previous section, the AU                       
Constitutive Act includes among its objectives the promotion of peace, security and                       






member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,                           
namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This de jure change in                         173
practice creates normative pressures and exemplifies that the internal affairs of Member                       
States matter to the union ­ a necessary precondition for future integration. 
The Constitutive Act has moreover been amended in 2003 to include the                       
possibility of AU intervention in a Member State upon a recommendation by the Peace                           
and Security Council (PSC) if a “serious threat to legitimate order” is present, or “to                             174
restore peace and stability to the Member State.” The AU has thereby become the only                             175
regional integration organization that has granted itself the right to interfere in its member                           
states in the case of instability or a coup d’état. Countries in which a coup d'état occurs                                 
are moreover immediately suspended from their AU membership, as was the case in                         
Togo and Madagascar in 2009 and Niger in 2010. AU troops have moreover intervened                           176
following coups d'état in Mali in 2012, and Togo and Mauritania in 2005.  177
Since its inauguration in 2002, the AU has seen the development of four major                           
initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), ​the African Peace                     
and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the                       
African Governance Architecture (AGA). ​In the year of its establishment, the new                       
Pan­African organization ratified NEPAD, which had been established by the OAU in                       







problems within a new paradigm.” NEPAD represents an attempt to institutionalize                     178
Pan­Africanism via a strategic framework, but has also been criticised for being based on                           
neoliberalism’s “unholy trinity” of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. Also                 179
in 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the                             
African Union, which amended Article 5 of the Constitutive Act, thereby establishing the                         
PSC. The PSC forms one pillar of the APSA, the other four pillars being the Panel of the                                   
Wise, the AU Peace Fund, the Continental Early Warning System and the African                         
Standby Force. These four were established by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment                         
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which came into effect in 2003                               
after adoption in 2002. The APRM is a voluntary review mechanism that seeks to ensure                             
participating member states’ conformity with the values of the AU in the areas of                           
political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio­economic               
development. It was created in 2003. The AGA was created in 2010 with the mandate to                               
coordinate between the various AU bodies tasked with promoting good governance. It                       
consists of three pillars: vision, institutional framework and processes of interaction                     
between relevant bodies.  180
The AU replaced the OAU with the ambitious goal of spearheading an African                         








peace and security, accelerate and intensify integration, foster development, improve                   
governance, and more. De jure, the AU has institutionalized the Janus­faced new                       
Pan­Africanism that simultaneously aspires to change Africa’s position in global relations                     
and improve the lives of African people. The question, then, is to what extent this                             
institutionalized Pan­Africanism is being implemented in practice. As one informant has                     
pointed out to me,  




The African Economic Community was established in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty,                       
which functions as a blueprint for the complete economic integration of African States                         
by 2027.  The AEC  has these ultimate objectives: 

















These objectives are to be achieved in six stages over a transitional period not exceeding                             
thirty­four years after the ratification of the treaty which occurred in May 1994. The                           189
duration of the first stage is set to five years with the goal of strengthening existing RECs                                 
and creating new RECs where they do not exist on the continent. The second stage has                               190
as its objectives the stabilization of tariffs, non­tariff barriers to trade, customs duties and                           
internal taxes, the strengthening of sectoral policies between member states, and the                       191 192
coordination of policies between the RECs. This stage is set at eight years. The third                             193 194
stage requires the eight RECs to each establish a free trade area and a customs union                               
during a period not exceeding ten years. The fourth stage then calls for the                           195
harmonization of tariff and nontariff systems over a period of two years. The fifth stage                             196
requires member states to harmonize sectoral policies, as well as the harmonization of                         197















this stage, the principle of free movement of persons shall be applied. The sixth and last                               
stage is set at a duration of five years and has the following objectives relating to                               200
economic integration: the strengthening of the common market through the completely                     
free movement of goods, services, capital and people; the establishment of a                       201
Pan­African Economic and Monetary Union; the creation of a central bank and                       202
introduction of a common currency.   203
The legal relationship between the AU and the AEC remains ambiguous. The                       
2001 Constitutive Act of the African Union takes precedent over the Abuja Treaty and                           
supersedes any of its provisions that are contradictory to the Constitutive Act.                       204
However, this seems to be largely a precautionary provision since the Abuja Treaty is far                             
more detailed with regards to economic integration. The relationship between the AU and                         
the RECs is governed by the ​Protocol on Relations Between the African Economic                         
Community and the Regional Economic Communities, which establishes an institutional                   
framework for negotiations between the AU and the RECs, as well as among the RECs.                             
These negotiations are somewhat informal and lack enforceable legal character. The                     
continental framework for economic integration is consequently vastly ambitious in                   









Eight RECs form the building blocks of the African Union and the African                         
Economic Community: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of                   
Sahel­Saharan States (CEN­SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa                     
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central                     
African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),                     
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African                   
Development Community (SADC). In this section, I discuss their development and                     
institutional framework. 
2.5.1. The Arab Maghreb Union 
Attempts to integrate the Arab states of North Africa date back to the                         
establishment of the ​Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM) in 1964                     
between Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya that had as its aim the harmonization of                           
policy regarding development and interregional trade with the European Economic                   
Community (EEC). These plans never materialized, and ​the AMU was consequently                     205
established in 1989 by the Treaty of Marrakesh by the heads of states of Algeria, Tunisia,                               
Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania. Although the hopes for political and economic                     
integration in the North African region were high, progress has remained limited as                         




between Algeria and Morocco. Since its inception, AMU has hosted a mere six                         206
summits of its heads of states, all between 1990 and 1994, and North Africa remains                             207
one of the least integrated regions globally. In light of the anticipated negotiations for                           208
the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) planned under the AEC framework, a                         
draft FTA agreement was signed and working group was set up in 2010 to develop a                               
protocol on rules of origin in preparation for the creation of an FTA. These rules of                               209
origin continued to be negotiated as this thesis was written. 
2.5.2. The Community of Sahel­Saharan States 
CEN­SAD was established by Mali, Niger Chad, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Libya                       
under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi in 1998 and became an REC of the AU in                               
2000. Its current member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic,                       210
Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,                   
















Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.                       211
Given its comparably recent establishment and broad membership, CEN­SAD has not                     
begun the process of the establishment of its FTA. Because all of its members have                             
membership in at least one other REC, a CEN­SAD FTA would be impossible to                           
implement, since it is not legally possible to adopt two differing external tariff regimes at                             
once. 
2.5.3. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  
The COMESA came into being with the establishment of a preferential trade area                         
by the Treaty of Lusaka in 1981. Today, the COMESA is composed of the following                             
nineteen member states: Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea,                     
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan,                 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although the implementation of both the                     212
COMESA free trade area and customs union are in progress, not all member states                           
participate in them. Five member states, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Swaziland, the                     
Seychelles and the DRC are not yet parties to the free trade agreement of the COMESA.                             
The implementation of the customs union has been complicated not only by the                           213
principle of variable geometry, but also by the problem of multiple membership. Kenya                         







parties to the EAC customs union. Thus, the common external tariff which has been                           214
established for four separate product categories with customs duties ranging from zero                       
per cent to twenty­five per cent is hardly implemented today. 
2.5.4. The East African Community  
The EAC was re­established by the 1999 Arusha Treaty after the dissolution of                         215
the former East African Community in 1977 and is comprised today of the Republics                           216
of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania. The                       217
economic integration achievements of the EAC include the implementation of a common                       
market and adaptation of a common external tariff scheme, as well as the harmonization                           
of certain economic policies and technical standards. Although the implementation of                     218
tariff reduction schedules is not entirely completed in all member states, the EAC has at                             
least legally completed the third stage of African economic integration as set out by the                             














The ECCAS was established in 1983 by the member states of the Central African                           
Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and the Economic Community of the Great                       
Lakes States (CEPGL), as well as Sao Tome and Principe and Angola, and subsequently                           
replaced these two organizations. Its members are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central                     
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and                     
Sao Tome and Principe. The ECCAS FTA has been de jure launched in 2004, but not yet                                 
established de facto since reforms in the member states are awaited.  220
2.5.6. The Economic Community of West African States 
The ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. Its member states                           
are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea­Bissau, Ivory                     
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger,Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania used to                       
be a member, but withdrew in 2000. The West African Customs and Monetary Union                           
(WAEMU) is comprised of a monetary union and a currency union for the ECOWAS                           









The IGAD replaced its predecessor, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought                   
and Development (IGADD), in 1996 in an effort to reinvigorate international cooperation                       
in East Africa. The members of IGAD are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,                         
Sudan, and Uganda. While the IGADD had been created in in 1986 as an organization to                               
facilitate intergovernmental development and drought control policy, the IGAD has                   
among its objectives cooperation in an expanded number of policy areas. Interestingly,                       
one of its objectives is to promote and implement the objectives of the COMESA and the                               
EAC. An IGAD FTA planned for 2009 was thus meant to be in harmony with the                               
COMESA FTA, but has not yet been implemented.  
2.5.8. The Southern African Development Community  
The SADC was created in 1992 to supersede the Southern African Development                       
Coordination Conference (SADCC). The SADC is split into the community at large                       
which is composed of fifteen member states, and the South African Customs Union                         
(SACU), which was established in 1910 and is the oldest customs union in the world. The                               
SADC has not yet reached the participation of all its members in its free trade area and                                 
customs union. The members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho,                         
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,               
Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Of these, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South                   
Africa, and Swaziland participate in the SACU. While the SACU is a completed free                           
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trade area and customs union, the SADC is making progress on the establishment and                           
implementation of a free trade area but not a customs union.  
2.5.9. The Tripartite Free Trade Area 
According to the economic integration schedule set out in the Abuja Treaty, all                         
RECs on the continent are supposed to each implement a free trade area and adopt a                               
common external tariff by 2016, while the deadline for REC mergers is less clearly                           221
outlined in the Abuja Treaty and merely envisions complete economic integration of the                         
continent by 2027. The problem of multiple membership and overlapping legal regimes                       222
in economic integration is especially prominent in Eastern and Southern Africa. The                       
Tripartite Free Trade Area aims at reducing these ambiguities through harmonizing                     















The previous chapter outlined the historical, institutional and legal evolution of                     
continental integration in Africa from the decades that preceded the inception of the OAU                           
to the present of the AU and its constituent RECs, as well as the AEC. Before turning to                                   
an assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the AU in Chapter 4, an                           
exploration of continental integration in Europe is instructive, since the EU constitutes                       
the most complete example of regional integration worldwide. This chapter is hence                       
devoted to this question: What lessons, if any, does the experience of continental                         
integration in Europe provide for African continental integration? I begin by first                       
outlining the reasoning behind and pitfalls of drawing comparisons between the EU and                         
the AU. Secondly, I discuss the similarities and differences between the two                       
organizations in terms of their history and institutions, followed by, thirdly, an analysis of                           





First, it is important to consider what speaks for a comparative study of the AU                             
and the EU, as well as the factors that demand a critical approach to such a comparison.                                 
As was discussed in the review of the concept of integration in Chapter 1.3, there exists a                                 
fundamental theoretical problem in the study of non­European regional integration.                   
Despite the proliferation of a multitude of diverse regional integration agreements and                       
organizations worldwide, such as NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in Latin                     
America, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and ANZCERTA in Australasia, to name only a                         
few, international integration tends to be analyzed utilizing the Eurocentric conceptual                     
frameworks that were developed against the backdrop of European integration. This fact                       
leads to two specific theoretical problems for the study of non­European integration.  
Firstly, the relative achievements and shortcomings of integration agreements and                   
organizations are frequently measured by the standards of the achievements of European                       
integration. Because the EU today boasts by far the deepest integration among the various                           
regional integration agreements and organizations worldwide, encompassing a monetary                 
union, an economic union, and a common market, albeit with varying patterns of                         
membership in each, any non­European regional organization will inevitably appear                   
either incomplete, such as NAFTA that as its name suggests is a free trade area only, or                                 
weak, such as ASEAN and the AU, where integration is ambitious de jure but                           
implementation is slow and incomplete in practice.  
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Secondly, the very use of Eurocentric conceptual framework for understanding                   
the reasoning behind and progression of regional integration is inadequate where regional                       
integration arose out of a different logic than the ECSC in the context of the aftermath of                                 
the Second World War, and where integration followed a different legal and institutional                         
progression than in the European case. Moreover, international integration regimes                   
worldwide vary greatly in their functional scope, number of member states, as well as                           
institutional setup, and further differ in their raison d’etre which may range from                         
economic gains to geopolitics and even the creation of new collective identities. With                         224
these considerations in mind, the EU and the AU nevertheless warrant a cautious                         
comparison given the apparent similarities between the organizations’ institutional                 
designs. 
The EU and AU were born out of different historical moments and within vastly                           
different economic, political, and social realities. On the one hand, the origins of formal                           
European integration that lead in 1992 to the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht that                             
created the EU lie in the post­war efforts to prevent the resurfacing of hostilities between                             
France and Germany through integrating their coal and steel sectors. The roots of the AU                             
amidst the continental struggle for independence in the second half of the twentieth                         
century, on the other hand, cannot be found in such an attempt at the pacification of                               
interstate conflict. Although conflicts in Africa were plentiful in the period from 1951,                         
when Libya became the first country on the continent to gain independence, and 1963,                           
when the OAU was established, these conflicts did not predominantly occur between                       
224 Laursen, “Regional Integration: Some Introductory Reflections,” 3. 
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independent African states. Rather, warfare in this period of African history can be                         
classified as either wars of liberation between colonized countries and their colonizers, or                         
civil wars.  
Despite these vastly different realities of Europe and Africa at the respective time                         
of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the OAU                               
in 1963, the institutional makeup of the AU at the time of its establishment in 2001 was                                 
modelled after that of the EU to a great extent. In the eyes of many, among them also                                   
African politicians, the institutional design of the EU did not only provide a blueprint for                             
the creation of the AU, but the “process and outcome of African integration must also                             
follow the logic and trajectory of European integration.” Taking into account the                       225
outlined differences in the initial logic that drove the first steps of integration in Europe                             
and Africa respectively, a cautious comparative study of the AU and EU is thus further                             





Here, I provide an analysis of the ways in which the EU and the AU are                               
historically and institutionally at once alike and distinct. The specific similarities and                       
differences between the EU and the AU both in terms of institutional design and                           




can be identified as instructive for integration at the AU. I have established the divergent                             
economic, political, and social realities that initiated early European and African                     
integration in the previous subsection. In addition, the two continents took divergent                       
roads to arrive at the present condition of of their respective continental organizations.                         
These divergent paths over time were shaped by the history of the two continents and                             
manifested themselves in institutional differences both in law and in practice.  
3.3.1. Historical Similarities and Differences 
The AU and EU developed quite differently. Not only was the initial logic for                           
integrating distinct on the African continent from that in Europe, European integration                       
also evolved in an expanding manner, while African integration encompassed all                     
independent African states from the start until the withdrawal of Morocco from the OAU                           
in 1984 in response to the 1982 admission of Western Sahara as a member state of the                                 
OAU. In addition, European states generally adopted agreements for future steps in                       
integration once previous steps were ratified and implemented, so that the de facto nature                           
of European integration at any given period in time parallelled its de jure blueprint. This                             
does not, however, mean that longer­term visions for future integration did not exist in                           
European integration. Rather, long­term visions were translated into law gradually.                   
During the OAU era, African integration can be said to have followed a somewhat                           
similar pattern of progression, with twenty­one treaties, conventions, protocols and                   
charters adopted between 1963 and 1998, as opposed to a staggering twenty­eight                       
between 2001 and 2014 at the AU. Nevertheless, the trend of adopting ambitious legal                           
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text prior to the complete implementation of previous legal obligations has its roots in the                             
OAU era and has intensified during the AU years. Thus, the de jure stage of integration in                                 
Africa is far ahead of its de facto nature. Because I have provided the history of African                                 
integration in Chapter 1, I now briefly review the history of European integration to the                             
extent that it is necessary to draw comparisons with the African integration experience. 
The history of European enlargement stands in stark contrast to the establishment                       
of the OAU by 32 states in 1963 and the immediate accession of an additional 20 states                                 
upon their independence. Similarly, the legal and institutional development of the EU                       
followed a much more gradual path than that of African integration with its ambitious                           
founding documents of 1963 and 2001 respectively. As previously stated, European                     
integration was born out of the desire to put an end to the centuries old antagonisms and                                 
conflicts between France and Germany. To this end, French foreign minister at the time                           
Robert Schuman proposed what became known as the Schuman Plan in 1950. The plan                           
envisioned the integration of German and French coal and steel industries to induce                         
cooperation and disincentivize conflict between the two states. On Schuman’s                   
recommendation, the 1951 Treaty of Paris established the ECSC. The ECSC had as its                           
member states not only France and West Germany, but also Belgium, Italy, the                         
Netherlands and Luxembourg. These initial six temporarily made up the core of                       




European States saw closer political and economic integration as a way to further                         
sustainable peace on the continent, and in 1957 the ECSC countries signed the Treaty of                             
Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom. In 1965,                     227
The Merger Treaty combined the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom into the EC, and merged                             
their institutions into a single governance structure. In 1973, Britain, Denmark, and                       228
Ireland joined the EC. Greece then joined the EC in 1981, followed by Spain and                             
Portugal in 1986 after Franco’s and Salazar’s regimes had fallen. In the same year, the                             
Single European Act was signed, furthering European integration through extending                   
qualified majority voting, and extending the legislative powers of the EP. It moreover                         229
set the objective for a single market to be established among member states by the end of                                 
1992.   230
As Europe became increasingly more economically and politically integrated,                 
plans were being made for the establishment of an even more integrated union with a                             
single market and common currency. In 1990, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was                         
launched and exchange controls abolished, which completely liberalized the flow of                     
capital in the EC. Two years later, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed and the EU                               
thereby established. It further extended the legislative powers of the EP and qualified                         








supranational rather than intergovernmental organization. The EU continued to expand.                   
In 1995, Sweden, Austria, and Finland became part of the union. Simultaneously,                       
economic and political integration was advancing and in 2002 the euro was introduced.  
Following the collapse of statist orders in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991,                         
the EU also began accession negotiations with formerly Soviet republics and other                       
countries previously led by communist parties, leading to the enlargements of 2004 and                         
2007. In 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,                       
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.                       231
Popular support for further political integration of the EU in many member states had                           
begun to decline after the 2004 enlargement, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution                         
for Europe (TCE), signed in the same year by twenty­five EU member states, failed to                             
come into force despite eighteen ratifications after it had been rejected by French and                           
Dutch voters in 2005. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007 as a compromise between                               
eurosceptics and those who wished to advance integration. It came into force in 2009.                           
Rather than establishing a single European constitution as the TCE would have, it                         
amended the Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Maastricht and renamed them to become the                             
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Treaty on European Union                           




way in which it functions.” ​In 2013, Croatia acceded the EU to become it newest                             232
member state.  
3.3.2. Institutional Similarities and Differences  
In addition to divergent historical paths, the institutions of the AU and EU are                           
distinct in their design and functioning despite certain similarities. Beginning with the                       
institutional similarities between the two organizations, it becomes apparent how closely                     
the superficial institutional design of the AU resembles that of the EU. Both                         
organizations have a commission, a parliament, a court of justice as well as a court of                               
human rights (although the European Court of Human Rights of course exists under the                           
Council of Europe, the membership of which extends beyond the member states of the                           
European Union). Moreover, each organization has two executive organs of which one is                         
comprised of the heads of states and the other of national ministers, an economic and                             
social committee, and a committee of permanent representatives.  
In principle, then, the AU Commission (AUC) resembles the European                   
Commission (EC), the Pan­African Parliament (PAP) resembles the European Parliament                   
(EP), the African Court of Justice (ACJ) resembles the European Court of Justice (ECJ),                           
the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government resembles the European Council of                           
the EU, the AU Executive Council resembles the EU’s Council of Ministers, the                         
Economic, Social, and Cultural Council of the AU (ECOSOCC) resembles the EU’s                       




Representatives Committee resembles the EU’s Committee of Permanent               
Representatives. There are, however, important differences between these seemingly                 233
alike institutional designs. The above pairs of institutional organs do not necessarily                       
possess the same functional scope in practice and unlike the EU, the AU is more                             
intergovernmental than supranational. The most pronounced differences in functional                 
scope of the two organizations’ corresponding organs can be found between the two                         
commissions, the European Council and the Assembly of Heads of State and                       
Government, as well as the EP and PAP. 
While as a staff member of the AU pointed out to me, “the AU Commission is                               
still seen as the secretariat of the member states,” the European Commission is                         234
inherently supranational in nature. Its staff members represent the interest of the EU, not                           
that of their country of citizenship. The same informant expressed that although the                         
design of the commission was to an extent a copy of the European model, the AUC was                                 
created without the same powers the EC possesses. As a result, it was quickly discovered                             
that the AUC could not function in the way it was set up and discussion was consequently                                 
underway at the time of interviewing for streamlining the commission, that is, to                         
restructure it to better respond to its tasks and pressures. According to the informant,                           235
the draft plan for this was to be due in January 2016 but at the time of writing, no such                                       





the Executive Council at the AU Ministerial Retreat in Mekele, Ethiopia, on January 24,                           
2016.  236
The European Council of the EU, too, is more supranational than the Assembly of                           
Heads of State and Government. At the AU, heads of states and government must “take                             
its decisions by consensus, or, failing which, by a two­thirds majority of the Member                           
States of the Union.” At the European Council, on the other hand, any decision that is                               237
taken during ordinary legislative procedure, under which approximately eighty per cent                     
of EU legislation is adopted, is taken by qualified majority voting (QMV). under this                           238
voting system, two conditions must be satisfied for a proposal to pass. First, fifty­five per                             
cent, or sixteen out of twenty­eight of member states, must vote in favor. Secondly, the                             
member states voting in favor must represent a minimum of sixty­five per cent of the                             
total EU population. Hence, while at the AU Assembly of Heads of State and                           239
Government consensus is the rule and majority voting the exception, the opposite is true                           
of the European Council. 
With regards to the parliaments of the EU and the AU, it is striking that at first,                                 
the PAP was established without full legislative powers and that its members are not                           










since 1979. The AU is currently working to transform the PAP into a legislative body                             
similar in nature to the EP. To this end, the PAP is given legislative powers by the                                 
revised Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the Pan­African                           
Parliament. Until this protocol comes into force, however, the PAP will remain a                         240
consultative assembly instead of a legislative body like the EP. 
3.4. Achievements and Shortcomings of European Integration 
What are the achievements of the EU and its predecessor organizations to date                         
and how have challenges affected the performance of the EU and perhaps lead to                           
shortcomings? The previous section provided the formal history of integration in Europe.                       
To understand the lessons, positive and negative, that the European experience has to                         
offer for African states, it is necessary to understand the achievements and shortcomings                         
that the formal history of European integration has as its consequence.  
3.4.1. Achievements of European Integration 
Historically, the main achievement of the EU lies in its contribution to stability                         
and economic prosperity on the European continent. The EU and its predecessor                       
organizations have managed to create and maintain peace among its member states on a                           
continent that had previously been shaken by centuries of warfare, although of course it                           
must be contended here that this achievement is relativized by the small number of states                             




1974, Croatia from 1991 to 1995, and Slovenia in 1991 occurred on the European                           
continent but before these states sought accession to the EU. 
The second, and quite technical, achievement lies in the degree of economic,                       
political, and social integration that has been achieved and the effect this had on the lives                               
of European citizens. The EU has successfully implemented a single market and                       
guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. EU citizens today                         
can seek employment in any member state without discrimination, many university                     
students take part in the Erasmus exchange program, and for many, albeit not all,                           
Europeans, nationals from other member states are no longer complete strangers. The EU                         
is furthermore politically integrated in policy areas ranging from agriculture to criminal                       
investigations and foreign policy. Thanks to the EU and its predecessors, Europe has                         
therefore become a truly interconnected region not only for governments and firms but                         
also for its citizens, and Europeans today are quite aware of the privileges and                           
responsibilities that accompany their being a citizen not only of their home country but                           
also the EU. 
The third achievement relates back to peace, namely the EU’s ability to exert                         
sticky power over its applicants and new member states and thereby spread norms of                           
democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Accession negotiations to the EU                         
presuppose a willingness of candidate states to implement the acquis communautaire, the                       
union’s set of legal standards for integrated policy areas. The incorporation of the                         
formerly socialist countries and former Soviet republics in the 2004 and 2007                       
enlargement, as well as Croatia’s recent accession, exemplify the EU’s ability to fuel                         
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democratization, economic development and the rule of law in neighbouring countries                     
through integrating them into the union. 
The final achievement of European integration that I would like to highlight here                         
is the predominantly supranational nature of the EU today. While the intergovernmental                       
European Council is responsible for setting the agenda of the EU, the European                         
institutions that create and implement policy have autonomous powers and their decisions                       
are legally binding for member states. In the European Council, decisions are taken by                           
qualified majority voting rather than by consensus. The supranational nature of the EU is                           
further exemplified by the fact that employees of the European Commission act in the                           
interest of the union and not of the member state that they are citizens of. The creation                                 
and functioning of the ECJ further highlights this major achievement of the EU, since it is                               
not only one of the most active regional courts, but also has jurisdiction over cases                             
between individual European citizens and the member states. It is therefore a truly                         
supranational institution that acts in the interest of the union and protects the rights that                             
European citizens are granted by the treaties. As a consequence of its supranational                         
nature, the EU constitutes a political entity that is more than just a secretariat for its                               
member states. It has developed into an organization that in many ways acts in its own                               
interests and protects these as they are defined in the treaties.  
3.4.2. Shortcomings of European Integration  
Since the onset of the euro crisis, and possibly in the years before, the EU has                               
experienced a series of challenges. One of the contemporary shortcomings of the EU lies                           
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in the creation of the “fortress of Europe”, especially with regards to migration. The EU                             
is experiencing a crisis at its gates as the plight of refugees intensifies and more and more                                 
migrants try to reach the EU by sea and land in order to apply for asylum. Frontex, the                                   
EU border protection agency, is under heavy criticism for surveillance technologies used                       
to detect boats with migrants before they enter the territorial waters of member states, and                             
there have been countless incidents of member states failing to help migrants in distress                           
at sea. 2015 saw the influx of over one million migrants into the EU and a total of                                   241
942,000 asylum claims made in its member states. Despite its relatively high number of                           242
accepted asylum applications, 184,655 in 2014 compared to 66,986 refugees resettled                     243
into the US in the same year, the EU continues to employ strategies to deter refugees                               244
from reaching its territory. Clearly, European states are focusing inward on internal                       
challenges related to its regionalization rather than outward in this regard, but they need                           
to take responsibility for what is happening at its borders and act in greater solidarity with                               
its migrants.  
The second contemporary shortcoming relates directly to the refugee crisis:                   












putting in questions the very ideals of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law on                               
which the EU was founded. Although xenophobic tendencies have existed in Europe                       
before, the euro crisis and its devastating economic consequences, such as high                       
unemployment, have created an angry class of EU citizens that increasingly opposes                       245
integration and immigration. This is leading to an increased orientation inward and                       
against all foreign, which is exemplified for instance by the violence against refugee                         
accommodations and ongoing protests of the Patriotic Europeans Against the                   
Islamization of the West (Pegida) movement in Germany. Although officially these                     
protests are directed against the perceived islamization of the West, in practice the                         
demonstrations have shown a xenophobic, racist, and homophobic tendencies.  246
Thirdly, and again in relation to the previous two shortcomings, the EU is not                           
managing to consolidate heterogenizing pressures from within as both popular and                     
government support for the EU are falling. The democratic deficit present in the EU has                             
been criticized for decades, and although efforts have been made to increase the                         
involvement of EU citizens in EU governance, “the ultimate democratization is presented                       
as a promise like the light at the end of the tunnel", as Jurgen Habermas had put it.                                   247
Simultaneously, right wing and eurosceptic movements, such as the Alternative for                     









Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, are on the rise in many, if not most, member states.                                 
Their success is in many ways boosted by the rising antagonism caused by the refugee                             
crisis as their anti­European plea to close the borders increases their popularity. While                         
currently eurosceptics define themselves mostly in terms of what they are against and                         
propose short­sighted policies but fail to articulate solutions to the challenges Europe                       
faces or what they stand for, the EU must find ways to make itself more attractive to its                                   
citizens if it wants to successfully counteract these trends. 
3.5. Lessons  
It appears nearly superfluous to state that the EU and the AU are at very different                               
stages in the process of regional integration, and that therefore many of their respective                           
current successes and challenges are particular to the context of their organizational                       
circumstances. The European Union has achieved almost complete economic and                   
political integration and must resolve problems that its integration has created, while the                         
African Union has a multitude of problems to resolve before it can proceed with                           
meaningful continental integration. Interestingly, the informants I interviewed at the AU                     
headquarters in Addis almost exclusively also believed that the EU provides valuable                       
lessons for the future of continental integration in Africa. Although informants                     
recognized that the EU is experiencing a break in its integration trajectory, one informant                           
stated that despite the challenges the EU faces, it is not failing in the eyes of AU staff.                                   
Rather, it is seen in Addis Ababa as a peaceful union that speaks with one voice, which                                 
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the AU aspires to become. Another informant stressed that in their eyes, the EU was                             248
not disintegrating despite the economic crisis and the migrant situation.                   249
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the EU, and even though the EU and AU are                           
located on different points of the spectrum from none to complete integration and have                           
followed divergent paths to arrive there, the European experience has at a minimum five                           
lessons to offer for those in charge of integration in Africa. 
First, several informants have expressed to me that one technical area in which                         
they believe the AU can learn from the European experience is the implementation of the                             
principle of the free movement of people. An informant explained that the free movement                           
of people is not only not implemented for the ordinary citizens of member states in many                               
regions of the African continent, but that even AU staff cannot necessarily move freely                           
between African states to pursue their work. While an AU passport that does not require a                               
visa for travel to member states exists for AUC staff, it was not granted to other                               
diplomats at the time of interviewing. The same informant had to visit an embassy on                             250
the day of the interview to obtain a visa to travel to an AU member state for a meeting the                                       
following morning. In 2015 it was announced that an AU passport would in the future be                               
available for all AU citizens as a part of Agenda 2063.   251
Secondly, another informant praised the European Structural and Investment                 







attempts to bring poorer members to the economic level of the union, and that the same is                                 
much needed at the AU. A 2013 feasibility study conducted by the UNDP and the AU                               252
examined the possibility of such an African Integration Fund (AIF) and proposed a                         
timeline according to which it would have commenced in the second quarter of 2015.                           253
No proposal for the AIF has been adopted to date. The AIF in contrast to the European                                 
Structural and Investment Fund would not support development initiatives in member                     
states but the financing of integration itself. 
In addition to the above lessons identified by informants in Addis Ababa, further                         
lessons can be drawn from the comparative study I have provided in this chapter. After                             
all, even if African integration in practice often follows a different logic than European                           
integration, the AU aspires to become much like the EU according to the AU staff I                               
interviewed.  
The third lesson thus relates to coping with shocks that rapid integration measures                         
can create. One informant stated, “sometimes we see the EU and we want to jump                             
through the steps the EU took between 1960 and now.” While this desire to advance                             254
integration quickly is commendable compared to the overwhelming reluctance to                   
integrate during OAU times, the European experience has shown that expedited measures                       








whole. Specifically, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the subsequent accession of the                         
new members to the Schengen Area have contributed to the rise of anti­European                         
movements in European states. In the case of the AU, of course, it is not enlargement that                                 
could create these shocks, since all African states except for Morocco are member states                           
at present. This lesson rather applies in the African context to the disruptive effects                           
inherent in the phase immediately after the implementation of economic integration                     
measures.  
Fourthly, European integration provides valuable lessons relating to popular                 
participation in the integration process. The threat to the continuation of integration at the                           
EU from the very citizens of its member states is related directly to the democratic deficit                               
in the EU, but in two distinct ways. Firstly, the ongoing perceived deficiency of channels                             
for democratic engagement in the affairs of the EU has contributed to the anger of the                               
political right. Secondly, because the EP is directly elected and composed of independent                         
European political parties, such anger has manifested itself in the success of anti­EU                         
political parties in the legislative body of the EU. The AU at present is much less directly                                 
democratic than the EU. In those member states that do have a functioning democratic                           
political system, citizens may indirectly influence AU policy through electing their                     
national governments, but such influence is diluted to an extent where it can hardly be                             
conceptualized as democratic. The AU has important lessons to learn about the                       
reconfiguration of power from a national to a continental level and the design of                           
democratic involvement in continental affairs. The AU therefore must ensure the                     
establishment of means for democratic participation at the continental level by following                       
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through with the implementation of full legislative powers for and direct elections to the                           
PAP if it wants to avoid the same popular criticism the EU has received. Yet, the                               
European experience should also raise caution about the combination of unpopular                     
policies and directly democratic institutions. Decisionmakers at the AU must decide                     
when the organization will be ready to transform itself into the democratic Pan­African                         
entity it seeks to become and how this will be achieved. 
A final lesson, technical and yet important, that the EU has to offer for the AU                               
relates to the consolidation and regular updating of EU treaties and the resultant legal and                             
practical simplification of the functioning of the union. As outlined in Chapter 3.3.1, the                           
first such simplification occurred in 1965, when the Merger Treaty consolidated the                       
institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom. In a similar vein, the Treaty of Rome that                               
had established the EEC in 1957 was renumbered and renamed the Treaty Establishing                         
the European Community (TEC), and subsequently became the TFEU with the coming                       
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon further transformed the                               
1992 Treaty of Maastricht into the TEU. The amendments of these two constitutional                         
documents of the EU were made in the light of the failed TCE and in response to changes                                   
taking place on the European continent. According to the EU law website, “​successive                         
enlargements have increased the number of EU countries to 28. It was therefore                         
necessary to adapt the way the European institutions function and how decisions are                         
taken.” The lesson for the AU to be drawn from these processes is bipartite: Firstly, as                               255
the EU evolved and the political context of European relations changed, the EU reformed                           
255 “The Treaty of Lisbon: introduction.” 
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itself to meet the legal and institutional demands of the time. The AU has undergone                             
similar processes of adaptation since its inception. These include the ongoing talks for                         
streamlining the AUC mentioned in Chapter 3.3.2, the adoption of the Protocol on                         
Relations between the RECs and the AU aimed at the clarification of the legal                           
relationships between the various entities involved in economic integration in Africa, and                       
the creation of the African Governance Infrastructure (AGA) to foster cooperation among                       
AU bodies working in the field of governance and democracy, both of which I address in                               
greater detail in Chapter 4.3. Notwithstanding such existing initiatives to clarify AU law                         
and optimize the functioning of the AU, there remains a lack of clarity in the legal and                                 
functional framework of the AU. The second part of this lesson the AU can learn from                               
the EU therefore relates to the need not only to adapt the union to the demands of the                                   
time by creating new legal text, bodies, institutions, and programs, but also to consolidate                           
and thereby simplify, as much as complex integration schemes permit, the legal                       












What are the successes and shortcomings of the AU to date and by what standards                             
can the performance of the Pan­African organization be evaluated? On the one hand, an                           
assessment of the milestones of integration reached by the AU as compared to the EU or                               
other regional organizations involves the risk of dismissing African (and other                     
non­European) integration regimes as weak or incomplete without a critical examination                     
of the AU. Through such a Eurocentric lens, one might risk overlooking some                         
achievements of the AU. Measuring the AU’s achievements by comparing the de jure                         
nature of integration in Africa with the reality on the ground might similarly lead to an                               
overly pessimistic outlook on integration in Africa because of the slow implementation of                         
ambitious AU law. On the other hand, not holding the AU accountable to its goals would                               
do injustice to the citizens that the organization was created to serve and whose lives                             
were meant to be improved through integration. With these considerations in mind, this                         




Assessing the performance of an organization as large and complex as the AU is                           
no easy task, especially given the tendency in the study of regional integration to dismiss                             
integration regimes that are perceived as weak due to a lack of legally binding                           
frameworks or a lack of enforcement thereof. This is the case not only with the AU, but,                                 
for instance, with ASEAN as well. With that said, identifying the shortcomings of such                           
regimes, as I do in the following section, is predominantly an exercise in functionalist                           
analysis. The achievements of “weak” integration regimes, on the contrary, should not                       
solely be measured by the extent to which their legal frameworks are implemented or one                             
might overlook some of the impact these organizations have had. In the case of the AU,                               
legal and institutional weakness is to a large extent, though not exclusively, caused by                           
compromised economic capacity. Instead of asking about completeness of                 
implementation and existence and application of legal enforcement mechanisms alone,                   
one might further like to ask what positive changes the AU has brought about despite low                               
capacity. In this light, four major achievements of the AU can be identified. 
The first achievement of the AU is its strong stance against unconstitutional                       
changes of government. Since the establishment of the OAU in 1963, there have been 91                             
successful coups d’état on the African continent. One informant stated, “In Africa we                         256





by H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo. Although the OAU had begun to create a set of policies and                               
an international legal framework which condemn unconstitutional changes of                 
government, it was only after the creation of the AU that such condemnation was                           
routinely put into practice. Previously to the first successful action of the Organization of                           
African Unity against a coup when Major Paul Koromah's seized power in Sierra Leone                           
in 1997, attempts by some member states to refuse recognition by the Organization of                           
African Unity to governments that had come to power by unconstitutional means in                         
Ghana in 1966, Uganda in 1971, Liberia in 1980, and Chad in 1982 had remained                             
unsuccessful.   258
The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in July 2000, not only revised                           
the insistence of the Organization of African Unity on the principles of non­interference                         
and sovereign self­determination but furthermore endowed the organization with powers                   
that exceed those previously possessed by the Organization of African Unity. Thus, while                         
Article 3.2 of the Organization of African Unity Charter provided for the “sovereign                         
equality of all member States,” and “non­interference in the internal affairs of States,”                       259
according to Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, the principles of the African Union                             260
include the “sovereign equality and independence of Member States of the Union,” and                         261








African Union Constitutive Act leaves the possibility of intervention in the internal                       
affairs of member states by the union. Article 4 (h) provides for  
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the                                 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and                     
crimes against humanity.   263
 
With regards to coups d’état, and contrary to the Organization of African Union Charter,                           
the Constitutive Act of the African Union moreover provides for the “condemnation and                         
rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.” It further provides for the                     264
suspension of member states in which an unconstitutional change of government occurs                       
from the African Union in Article 30. The 2000 Lomé Declaration clarifies what                         
situations the African Union considers unconstitutional changes of government, namely                   
where a “military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government,”                   
“intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government,” the                   
“replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and                   
rebel movements,” or “the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the                           
winning party after free, fair and regular elections” occur. The Protocol Relating to the                           
Establishment of The Peace and Security Council of the African Union regulates the                         
measures that the African Union can take against countries in which an unconstitutional                         
change of government has occurred, notably providing the PSC with the power to impose                           
sanctions on member states in question. Most recently, the ​African Charter on                       




adopted in 2007, amends the definition of situations of unconstitutional change of                       
government provided in the Lomé Declaration to include “any amendment or revision of                         
the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of                         
democratic change of government.” The Charter further bans perpetrators of                   265
unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections once order is                     
restored, and provides that they could be tried before an African Union court. It                           266 267
lastly extends the powers of the Peace and Security Council to act to maintain                           
constitutional order even before an unconstitutional change of government occurs.   268
To date, the African Union has taken action against unconstitutional changes of                       
government in twelve of its member states, namely Togo in 2005, Mauritania in 2005 and                             
2008, Guinea in 2008, Madagascar in 2009, Niger in 2010, Ivory Coast in 2010, Guinea                             
Bissau in 2012, Mali in 2012, Egypt and Libya in 2013, The Central African Republic in                               
2013, and Burkina Faso in 2015. 
The second achievement of the AU likewise relates to promoting stability in                       
Africa. In comparison with its predecessor, the AU displays a credible commitment to                         
address peace and security issues on the continent with continental frameworks and,                       
where necessary, interventions. In addition to fighting the culture of unconstitutional                     








help combat the myriad of conflict, predominantly civil conflict, that has ailed the                         
continent since the struggle for independence. Considering that many observers, such as                       
a former OAU official I interviewed, question whether political and economic integration                       
can progress before peace, stability, and democracy advance across the continent, this                       269
is not only commendable in itself but can also be considered a step towards closer                             
economic and political cooperation in the future. Following the end of the Cold War era,                             
the role of regional organizations, especially in Africa where intra­state conflict became                       
the prevalent form of hostilities, in maintaining international peace and security                     
expanded, as they gradually became more involved in the prevention and management of                         
international and civil conflict. The involvement of the OAU in African conflicts had                         270
been limited by its strict interpretation of the principles of sovereignty and                       
non­interference in domestic affairs of member states, so that examples of OAU conflict                         
intervention, such as in Chad, Burundi and the Comoros, are few and their successes                           
limited. Consisting of the PSC, ​the Panel of the Wise, the AU Peace Fund, the                             271
Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force, the APSA is a                         
manifestation of collective political will to prioritize peace and security over state                       
sovereignty in accordance with the responsibility to protect principle. APSA, unlike                     
previous African peace and security initiatives, further has an underlying theoretical                     








to a state of peace. Besides the willingness of the AU, unlike the OAU, to intervene in                                 272
intra­state conflict, such as with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),                       
APSA further provides conflict prevention mechanisms through the Continental Early                   
Warning System. To date, the PSC has sent or authorized 64,000 peacekeepers to the                           
many missions across the continent, frequently carried out in cooperation with the UN.  273
The third achievement of the AU is its focus on improving governance and                         
increasing popular participation on the continent through initiatives under the AGA. This                       
is perhaps the least functionalist item in this assessment because it is not necessarily the                             
state of its implementation but creation of a normative continental governance framework                       
that deserves recognition. African states have long been criticized internationally for their                       
largely poor performance in the areas of democracy, governance, and human rights. The                         
adoption and coming into force of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and                         
Governance, as well as the establishment of the APRM, the PAP, the ECOSOCC, and the                             
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is to be merged with the ACJ to                               
create a single African Court of Justice and Human Rights pursuant to decisions of the                             
Assembly in 2004 and 2005, institutionalize the participatory and democratic vision of                       
the new Pan­Africanists. With this framework, the AU takes a clear stance against the                           








increased civil society involvement, and respect for human and peoples’ rights. These                       
initiatives are not faultless, as the domestication of and adherence to their principles is                           
making slow progress. While many African states transitioned away from authoritarian                     
governance, few have reached the status of a full democracy. I discuss the functional                           
liabilities of the AGA in the following section. Nevertheless, codifying progressive                     
governance norms brings the AU one step closer to implementing them, which is a                           
central prerequisite for closer political and economic integration since democracies have                     
historically engaged more in international cooperation than more autocratic states. 
A fourth achievement of the AU is its ability, remarkable when compared with the                           
OAU, to assemble representatives from member states and prompt them to take speedy                         
decisions on pressing issues. One AU staff said, “the AU derives its importance from its                             
convenient power. It assembles leaders and places an issue before them and forces them                           
to address it.” Permanent AU staff, especially of the AUC, thus has the ability to                             274
enhance and influence cooperation and integration despite the AU’s predominantly                   
intergovernmental nature. The informant added, “any issue you can bring before them,                       
place on their agenda, the convenient power has an advantage.” As a predominantly                         275
optimistic and progressive entity, the AUC in this way can influence the direction of                           
conversation of African leaders during AU summits and meetings, and place                     
controversial issues on the table. The optimism of AU staff, although genuine in my                           




implementing ambitious AU programs, as another informant pointed out. The AU has in                         
this way nevertheless managed to speedily and effectively address some of the crises that                           
the African continent faced during its existence, as is evidenced by its successful                         
response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa that began in 2013. 
4.3. The Shortcomings of the African Union 
Despite the achievements of the AU, the Pan­African organization is not without                       
its limitations, three of which I identify in this section.. The first shortcoming of African                             
integration at the AU lies in the frequently slow, incomplete, or even lacking                         
implementation of AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, and Charters. This problem                   
begins in many instances with a slow process of the signing of documents by member                             
states and a relatively long period of time after the adoption of a document for a sufficient                                 
number of member states to ratify the latter for its entry into force. For instance, the                               
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union was adopted on July 1, 2003, but                                 
entered into force only six year later on February 11, 2009. Other documents have not                             276
entered into force at all, such as the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of                               
the African Union and the Protocol to the OAU Convention on Preventing and                         
Combatting Terrorism, which were adopted in 2003 and 2004.   277
The AU and RECs either lack effective schemes for the enforcement of the                         
implementation of agreements, or, where such schemes exist, they are not invoked on a                           




unwillingness of political leadership to relinquish sovereignty, implement treaties,                 
charters and conventions, and liberalize their respective economies. Many AU member                     
states are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and practice protectionism not                       
least to grow and diversify their domestic economies before liberalization. The principle                       
of variable geometry thus is a key reason for the flexibility in the implementation of                             
African integration agreements. An important additional reason for the failure of African                       
RECs and the AEC to establish a legally binding and consistently enforced framework                         
for international integration, especially economic integration, like that of the European                     
Union, is the cost associated with the liberalization of economies and the judicial reform                           
that integration agreements, whether economic or political, entail. Even where the                     
willingness to liberalize and utilize the economic benefits of greater liberalization or to                         
implement political integration documents exists, African states often lack the revenues                     
to put aspirations into practice. This includes not only a loss of revenue from the                             
elimination of customs duties in free trade areas and costs related to steps such as                             
implementing common tariff classification systems in the case of economic integration,                     
but also the costs associated with executing changes in the domestic legislature to                         
domesticate international agreements. These factors might help explain why legal                   
documents that are adopted at the AU are not necessarily ratified speedily or                         
implemented fully and in a timely manner in the member states.  
In the light of these challenges to African economic integration, the question                       
arises whether the stage approach to economic and political integration set out in the                           
Abuja Treaty may be overly ambitious, and the RECs should completely implement their                         
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respective free trade areas and customs unions before negotiating agreements among each                       
other; or whether greater legal harmonization will ease future implementation of                     
economic integration on the continent. The COMESA, the EAC, and the SADC have met                           
the objective set out in the Abuja Treaty to merge RECs, but other RECs are not likely to                                   
meet this target any time soon. On the question of the meeting of deadlines, an AU staff                                 
member said, “deadlines are there. In 2017 we have to achieve the common African Free                             
Trade Area. But as I said, I don’t think Central Africa will be able to achieve it.”  278
In a similar vein, the question arises whether legal documents not relating to the                           
African Economic Community, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and                       
Governance, should be less ambitious in character and more strictly enforced, or whether                         
these documents function as a progressive normative framework that will create the                       
desired political change over time. The danger of such an approach, of course, is that                             
citizens and politicians alike might stop taking AU law seriously if there are no                           
repercussions for a member state’s failure to implement it. Someone at the AU                         
headquarters commented on this challenge,  
The AU cannot prescribe what kind of political and economic system a country                         
adopts, but the AU asks that if a country ratifies an instrument, it implements it                             
within its political and constitutional context.   279
 






A second shortcoming of the AU is its inherent lack of legal and functional                           
clarity. In terms of legal clarity, the status of the RECs within the AEC, as well as that of                                     
the AEC within the AU is not well defined. Since these are separate legal entities, their                               
precise legal relationships to each other should be established by legal agreements, which                         
has not fully occurred but the AU Constitutive Act does establish the AEC as an integral                               
part of the AU. Legally, this is odd since through being a member state of AMU,                               281
Morocco thus is a part of the AEC, but the AU Constitutive Act was adopted by the AU,                                   
of which Morocco is not a member state. The conflation in practice of the separate legal                               
entities that are the AEC and AU would thus eventually have as a consequence the de                               
facto membership of Morocco in the AU once a Pan­African economic and monetary                         
union is implemented under the AEC framework for economic integration. There does                       
exist the Protocol on Relations Between the RECs and the AU, but it does not actually                               
address the question of legal status of the RECs and their relationship to the AEC and                               
AU, that is whether they are members, organs, subjects or agents of the AEC or AU, so                                 
that it is difficult to formally establish that they are subject to the decisions of the AEC                                 
and AU. It has been argued by scholars such as Richard Oppong that this legal                             282
flexibility inherent in the African continental and regional schemes for integration is a                         
major obstacle to its success. Oppong argues that while a strong and binding legal                           
framework is not a sufficient condition for successful integration, it is a necessary                         





flexibility and multiple membership in African economic integration communities is the                     
degree of ambiguity of existing legal frameworks. It is, for instance, legally impossible                         
to be part of two customs unions and implement two separate common external tariffs at                             
once, a problem Kenya and Uganda were faced with as members of both the EAC and the                                 
COMESA prior to the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. Other African                         
states continue to face this problem.  
African integration today faces not only such legal ambiguity, but also the                       
challenge of vague and overlapping responsibilities of the organs that compose the AU,                         
AEC, and RECs, as well as competing competence with the United Nations Economic                         
Commission for Africa (UNECA) and a dichotomy between the work of permanent staff                         
and the representatives of member states. With regards to the former, a multitude of                           
organs and initiatives has been established since the AU came into being that often have                             
similar or overlapping objectives and responsibilities. While there are attempts at                     
simplifying this, such as the African Governance Architecture (AGA) which creates                     
dialogue between different political organs and initiatives, such initiatives have often                     
added more tasks and costs to African integration than they have eliminated, so that the                             
overall landscape of AU initiatives remains confusingly plentiful.  
The relationship between the work of the AU and the UNECA is not always clear                             
in practice either. Formally, the UNECA is meant to act as a kind of think tank for the                                   
mandate of the AU, yet in practice the UNECA frequently is engaged in tasks that one                               
should think lie with the AU. The two organizations frequently act as partners in                           
implementing projects, collecting intelligence, and publishing reports. Nevertheless, as a                   
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diplomat working for an embassy in Addis Ababa has pointed out to me, there appears to                               
be a competitiveness for responsibility between the AU and UNECA. The UNECA, on                         
the one hand, credits the lack of capacity of the AU with its own increased involvement.                               
Others, on the other hand, see this increased involvement as undermining the credibility                         
of the AU as an organization that aims at decreasing the dependence of African states.   284
A third weakness of African integration and one that has outlived the OAU era to                             
an extent is the reluctance of African leaders to pool sovereignty to achieve the objectives                             
of integration. To AU staff, continental unity appears central to the transformation to                         
greater self­sufficiency and heightened influence in global governance of the continent.                     
Someone at the AU headquarters stated, “together we will win. Alone we will lose.”                           285
Such unity does not, however, exist between African states in many policy areas. One                           
informant explained, “Conversation is ongoing and fruitful in some areas but difficult in                         
others. While the EU can speak with one voice, at the AU it’s more difficult.” For unity                                 286
to be institutionalized, the implementation of existing agreements, as well as continued                       
harmonization, and eventual unification, of national policies at the Pan­African level is                       
necessary. Yet, as one informant at the AU headquarters contended, “there still is                         







The scope and intensity of international cooperation between African states has                     
increased with the dismantling of authoritarian regimes and the advance of democracy on                         
the continent. Despite this paradigm shift regarding the norms of sovereignty and                       
non­interference that accompanied the transition from the OAU to the AU, however, the                         
AU has thus far remained an intergovernmental organization despite ambitions to form a                         
union of states. There are several reasons for why this is the case in addition to the                                 288
aforementioned disagreement between African leaders about whether integration should                 
be gradual or revolutionary. Firstly, African states have fought hard for their                       
independence and sovereign self­determination, and are consequently often reluctant to                   
give it up. Indeed, research has found a correlation between leaders of the independence                           
movement being in power and African states’ willingness to cede sovereignty to the AU                           
or the RECs they are members of. In many African states, this remains the case. In                               289
Zimbabwe, for instance, Robert Mugabe has held on to power since 1980. Secondly,                         
some scholars have advanced the argument that the vast social, cultural, political and                         
economic heterogeneity of the African continent complicates attempts at pooling                   
sovereignty. Lastly, AU member states appear to be politically and economically                     290
oriented toward their RECs and the world at large much more so than toward the African                               












What does the future hold for the AU in particular, and African integration in                           
general? This study has established that in the fourteen years of its existence, the AU has                               
begun to institutionalize a paradigm shift with regards to development, democracy, and                       
governance. A new generation of African leaders reinvigorated the philosophy of                     
Pan­Africanism and stressed not only the importance of placing the African continent in a                           
more beneficial position on the global playing field by combatting the effects of                         
colonialism and imperialism, but additionally the need for scrutinizing domestic                   
governance. The AU has created an ambitious vision for a united, stable, and more                           
prosperous continent characterized by good governance. The most prominent obstacles to                     
African unity through integration are the slow progress of implementation of                     
international agreements, the lack of clarity with regards to the legal relationship between                         
the AU and the RECs and the relationship of the RECs with one another, the varying                               
levels of economic development among member states of the AEC, and finally, the                         
distaste for the relinquishing of power to supranational institutions that enforce treaty                       
implementation. Despite its achievements in the areas of peace and security, stability, and                         
governance, the AU has not been able to increase the influence of the continent in global                               
affairs significantly, and the AU is not yet integrated enough to be able to speak with one                                 
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voice internationally, as member states are frequently oriented more towards international                     
partners or the RECs that they participate in. 
Globalization today could become an opportunity as opposed to a misfortune for                       
the continent, as a billion consumers, driven by the cheetah generation and emerging                         
middle classes, are taking increased economic and entrepreneurial leadership. One                   
informant stated, 
the main driver of interaction on the continent is not the AU but young people.                             
They see the AU cannot get them to where they want to go, so they are doing it                                   
themselves through channels such as social media.  291
 
According to the World Bank, doing business on the continent today is easier than it has                               
ever been before, not least because of the strengthening of the rule of law and                             292
improvement of economic governance in many member states since the political                     
transitions of the 1990s and the transformation of the OAU into the AU. With its                             
abundant natural resources, some of the youngest populations, and some of the fastest                         
growing economies in the world, Africa’s potential for development is apparent.                     
Nevertheless, numerous African countries repeatedly rank among the lowest in the world                       
in income per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI), and indicators of the quality                           
of governance and democracy. Corruption, capital flight, and conflict persist as major                       
obstacles to prosperity despite regional and continental initiatives to fight them. African                       





especially commodity exporters have little chance for intra­regional trade, and                   
significant barriers to the free movement of goods and people mean that it is easier today                               
for a British tourist to obtain a visa for Namibia than it is for a Nigerian national, and                                   
easier to import a Belgian car to Burundi than a South African one. Opportunities are                             293
abundant, but the AU and its member states must ensure that they create a context in                               
which they can be exploited. 
The AU proclaimed 2013 the Year of Pan­Africanism, during which it published                       
a vision for the transformation of the African continent in the fifty years until 2063.                             
According to the AUC, Agenda 2063 is at once a declaration of aspirations and an                             
ambitious plan of action. It articulates the following seven aspirations to be implemented                         
by 2063:  
● A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development  294
● An integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism                       
and the vision of Africa’s renaissance   295
















Similarly to existing AU frameworks, Agenda 2063 is vastly ambitious and acts more as                           
a general blueprint than a concrete plan of action. It is now time that less enthusiastic                               
member states overcome the unwillingness to address domestic ills so that the                       
commendable vision and guiding principles of the AU, the RECs, and the AEC can be                             
more tangibly put it to practice across the continent than has been the case to date. The                                 
way forward should therefore not be defined by the abandonment of the idea of African                             
emancipation through African solutions to African problems, but capacity building in                     
order to ensure that weaker member states catch up to more successful African states,                           
such as Ghana, Senegal, and Botswana. 
Two prerequisites to achieving the vision enshrined in Agenda 2063 are more                       
participatory African politics domestically and at the continental level, as well as                       
visionary leadership that works toward their countries’ transformation and by implication                     
the transformation of the continent. Firstly, despite the ECOSOCC and PAP, the AU is                           
not universally well­known among Africans. Nearly all informants in Addis Ababa have                       
addressed this topic during my interviews. One informant stated,  
there is the need to make people believe in our organization and the need for                             







Another informant spoke about how even in Addis Ababa, where the AU Headquarters                         
are located, the organization is not well­known. They stated,  
the biggest risk now with the African Union is that if I ask someone to take me                                 
from my house to the AU, after a few minutes they will ask: OAU?   302
 
The AU was created to transform African integration from an intergovernmental “talking                       
shop” into a regime that serves the needs of the citizens of its member states. Although                               
high levels of technical expertise are necessary to achieve this goal, and top­down policy                           
is thus justified, the AU cannot ignore the people it was created to serve, or else it risks                                   
the rise of similar popular criticism that the EU has had to face.  
Secondly, strong and visionary leadership has had a special place in the                       
accomplishments of African success stories such as Botswana. Comparatively weak                   
institutions, missing checks and balances, and relatively undeveloped democratic political                   
cultures mean that in Africa, leaders are more powerful than their counterparts elsewhere.                         
Seen as a curse in the past, this could, paired with the right leaders, be a blessing in                                   
disguise for the fight against the prevailing problems on the continent. Although such a                           
commitment to transformative leadership is apparent among the permanent staff of the                       
AU, the predominantly intergovernmental nature of the organization has as a                     
consequence that national leadership determines the seriousness with which continental                   
policy is domesticated. Visionary leaders who think in the long­term and are committed                         
to taking measures against the kinds of threats to an African transformation, such as                           
302 AU Official, interviewed by Elizaveta Bekmanis, July 29, 2015.   
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corruption, that prevail on the continent could indeed place their countries on a trajectory                           
to improved governance, accelerated development, and a commitment to continental                   
unity. Moreover, a third kind of visionary leadership would aid the effort to achieve the                             
mission of the AU. In addition to progressive AU staff and transformative national                         
leaders, there is a need for public leaders to endorse and advocate for African integration.                             
At the time leading up to the establishment of the OAU and during its existence,                             
numerous public figures and public intellectuals tasked themselves with advancing the                     
cause of African unity in international relations, as well as local and global public                           
opinion. These leaders, who included Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie, and Julius                     
Nyerere, made African integration efforts known at home and abroad. While in the                         
decade leading up to the supersession of the OAU by the AU, the advocates for an                               
African renaissance did publicly advocate for African solidarity and unity, these public                       
voices have become somewhat more silent since. Muammar Gaddafi and Thabo Mbeki,                       
arguably the two most prominent advocates for African integration in the AU era, have                           
not become as universally known as advocates for integration as the earlier generation of                           
Pan­Africanists. This is especially true with regards to making African integration known                       
to African people. More participatory continental politics, however, depend also on the                       
existence of public leaders who can make a convincing case for the AU among the                             
citizens of is member states.  
African integration has the potential externally to increase the continent’s                   
bargaining power in global affairs. Internally, a reconfiguration of power between the                       
national and the continental level could help to productively accommodate Africa’s                     
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diversity and leave behind the perils of nation­statism that had characterized the OAU                         
era. At independence, decolonization proceeded without a questioning of Westphalian                   
sovereignty, so that out of the three options for political organization at independence,                         
namely states based on the pre­colonial ethnic makeup of the continent, an adoption of                           
the colonial map, and a Pan­African federation, the colonial template was adopted.   303
In conclusion, then, the AU could bring the continent a step closer to the early                             
Pan­African ideal of an African federation that utilizes integration to benefit its citizens.                         
Integration would not, however, imply a disappearance of member states but rather                       
involves a reconfiguration of power on the continent so that the development of the                           
continent will have a center of gravity in Addis Ababa. Viable states at a local level                               
would thus take cues from a new center of African capacity at the AU. These states will                                 
remain, as in the EU, the primary point of democratic involvement of citizens, and                           
involvement of civil society at the Pan­African level thus has to be designed with a level                               
of ingenuity to ensure sufficient representation in continental decision­making processes.                   
Otherwise, the AU might begin to experience similarly low levels of popular support as                           
the EU, where, quite opposite to the AU, the function of the organization is stronger than                               
its current vision. Despite its functional problems that delay implementation, the legal                       
and institutional framework of the AU displays a strong commitment to integration,                       
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